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INTRODUCTION
THE U.S. GLOBAL Positioning System (GPS) is in deeptrouble and in need of remediation for the following
reasons:
(1) Civilian GPS is operated and controlled by the Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD).1 It is an essential element of
much military equipment and civilian infrastructure and
devices.2 Both military and civilian uses are growing rap-
idly, but the two uses have become increasingly estranged
from each other, as military authorities build a new, sepa-
rate secure system for military use only.3 The future of
civilian GPS is uncertain.4
(2) Military authorities are actively preparing for cyber war-
fare and want to retain freedom to use their offensive and
defensive cyber warfare capabilities to interfere with ad-
versaries’ Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS).5
(3) Increasingly, military interference harms civilian satellite
navigation signals: examples include the forced diversion
of shipping in the Black Sea and commercial airline traf-
fic in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.6
1 Frequently Asked Questions, GPS.GOV, https://www.gps.gov/support/faq/
[https://perma.cc/ZM6H-MDZA].
2 Justin Lee, What Is M-Code and Where to Learn More About Next-Gen Military GPS,
MODERN BATTLE SPACE (Apr. 26, 2019), https://modernbattlespace.com/2019/
04/26/what-is-m-code-and-where-to-learn-more-about-next-gen-military-gps/
[https://perma.cc/5L5K-LTHX]; GPS Applications, GPS.GOV, https://www.gps.
gov/applications/ [https://perma.cc/54KC-2B6Z].
3 Lee, supra note 2.
4 See Mariam Baksh, Federal Contracts to Require Secure Timing and Navigation
Under Executive Order, NEXTGOV (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.nextgov.com/cyber
security/2020/02/federal-contracts-require-secure-timing-and-navigation-under-
executive-order/163084/ [https://perma.cc/7PFY-SLTH]; see, e.g., Contracts For
Aug. 31, 2020, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Con
tracts/Contract/Article/2331179/ [https://perma.cc/7WJM-FLWE] (describing
DOD contract for a military alternative to GPS).
5 A New Global Ranking of Cyber-Power Throws Up Some Surprises, Digital Dominance,
ECONOMIST (Sept. 19, 2020), https://www.economist.com/science-and-technol
ogy/2020/09/17/a-new-global-ranking-of-cyber-power-throws-up-some-surprises
[https://perma.cc/6L8P-QD92].
6 See Hiroyuki Yamada, IMO and the GNSS, Navigating the Seas, INSIDE GNSS,
Sept./Oct. 2017, at 40, 40, https://insidegnss.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/
01/sepoct17-LAW.pdf [https://perma.cc/S52Y-YJNE]; see also Greg Milner, How
Vulnerable Is G.P.S.?, NEW YORKER (Aug. 6, 2020) , https://www.newyorker.com/
tech/annals-of-technology/how-vulnerable-is-gps [https://perma.cc/DFF6-
UWG2]; Anusuya Datta, Vulnerabilities of GPS Is a Big Concern: Dana Goward, GEOS-
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(4) Spectrum jamming and spoofing tools are cheaply, easily
acquired and are used for illegitimate purposes.7
(5) The scarcity of—and the sharp competition for—radio
frequencies cause harmful radio interference with the sig-
nals used by GPS and by the other GNSS, as exemplified
by the 2020 Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
award of frequencies to Ligado Networks (Ligado).8
(6) The existing four GNSS—EU’s Galileo, U.S. GPS, Russia’s
GLONASS, and China’s BeiDou—compete with each
other, demonstrated by (1) Galileo requiring European
Union (EU) GNSS operators have Galileo access and (2)
the FCC restricting foreign GNSS access to U.S. sovereign
space.9
(7) GNSS tracks (1) criminals; (2) civilians; and (3) COVID-
19 victims in violation of life, liberty, and property—pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
and by the Declaration of Human Rights.10
(8) Harmful interference with civilian GNSS signals causes in-
creasing need for encryption of civilian signals, but en-
cryption will establish a different, more limited access to
GNSS.11
(9) U.S. government leadership of GPS policy is scattered. It
should be unified. The FCC struggles with the executive
branch over allocation of spectrum for GPS. Further-
more, GPS navigation safety is not adequately improved
by prospective civilian GPS regulation on the basis of eco-
nomics by the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC),
rather than on the basis of safety by the interagency Na-
tional Executive Committee for Space-Based Positioning,
PATIAL WORLD (Sept. 5, 2020), https://www.geospatialworld.net/blogs/vulnera
bilities-of-gps-is-a-big-concern-dana-goward/ [https://perma.cc/SXS7-SAUR].
7 See infra Part III; see also Paul Tullis, GPS Is Easy to Hack, and the U.S. Has No
Backup, SCI. AM. (Dec. 1, 2009), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/gps-
is-easy-to-hack-and-the-u-s-has-no-backup/ [https://perma.cc/8R3U-8X6W].
8 E.g., In the Matter of LightSquared Tech. Working Grp. Report, 35 FCC Rcd.
3772, 3783 (2020). In 2016, LightSquared Subsidiary LLC became Ligado Net-
works (Ligado). LightSquared and GPS, GPS.GOV, https://www.gps.gov/spectrum/
lightsquared/ [https://perma.cc/56C2-AQHG].
9 LightSquared, 35 FCC Rcd. at 3773 n.2; Paul B. Larsen, International Regulation
of Global Navigation Satellite Systems, 80 J. AIR L. & COM. 365, 398 (2015); What Is
Galileo?, EUR. SPACE AGENCY, http://www.esa.int/Applications/Navigation/
Galileo/What_is_Galileo [https://perma.cc/M7AX-H2GJ].
10 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, arts. 3, 17 (Dec. 10, 1948); see also infra Section VI.A.
11 See Larsen, supra note 9, at 411–12; see also infra Section IX.C.
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Navigation, and Timing (PNT Committee), Department
of Transportation (DOT), and Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA).12
(10) All four GNSS are plagued by increased traffic conges-
tion, debris accumulation, collision danger, and scarcity
of radio frequencies and orbits in outer space.13
GPS is an essential pillar of support for U.S. and international
infrastructure. Unless it is strengthened, the growing number of
jammings, spoofings, and harmful interferences will destroy
GPS. Silence and inactivity are implied acceptance of these activ-
ities. This Article discusses options and suggests solutions.
Aviation, shipping, the electric grid, computers, military
equipment, and many other parts of our basic infrastructure
now depend on vulnerable GNSS signals.14 These signals are
weak, able to be suspended or “jammed” by stronger signals,
and easily subject to harmful interference.15 For example,
“spoofing” happens when a weak GNSS signal is hacked and
changed by an outside agent.16 Harmful interference may hap-
pen in multiple ways. An agent may disrupt the signal simply by
buying a radio-frequency jamming device for as little as
$200.00.17 Or that agent may deviously substitute the existing
12 Agenda: 60th Meeting of the Civil GPS Service Interface Committee, GPS.GOV,
https://www.gps.gov/cgsic/meetings/2020/ [https://perma.cc/7KYC-FAMJ];
Civ. GPS Serv. Interface Comm., DHS PNT Update, at 2:18:48, YOUTUBE (Sept. 22,
2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=8328&v=6FpKN018zSM&feature=you
tu.be (last visited June 2, 2021) (featuring James Platt, Director, PNT Program
Management Office, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.); Civ. GPS Serv. Interface
Comm., Resilient PNT System Concepts for Critical Infrastructure, at 2:50:14, YOUTUBE
(Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=10214&v=6FpKN018zSM
&feature=youtu.be (last visited June 2, 2021) (featuring Arthur K. Scholz, Princi-
pal Engineer, The MITRE Corporation). The CGSIC met virtually Sept. 21–22,
2020. Agenda: 60th Meeting of the Civil GPS Service Interface Committee, supra. The
meeting, which the Author attended, discussed the range of issues discussed in
this Article. Id. References are based on the Author’s personal notes. See also infra
Section VII.B.
13 Paul B. Larsen, Minimum International Norms for Managing Space Traffic, Space
Debris, and Near Earth Object Impacts, 83 J. AIR L. & COM. 739, 742, 747, 751 (2018);
see also Mark Harris, Who Gets To Send Radio Waves in Space?, MIT TECH. REV. (June
26, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/06/26/134533/spectrum-
wars-satellite-communication/ [https://perma.cc/JD4Q-7SWB].
14 Lee, supra note 2.
15 Datta, supra note 6.
16 Id.
17 Int’l Comm. Glob. Navigation Satellite Sys., Presentation: Proliferation of GPS/
GNSS Jammer Devices, U.N. OFF. OF OUTER SPACE AFFS., https://unoosa.org/docu
ments/pdf/psa/activities/2019/UN_Fiji_2019/IDM/2-06-1120.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q6YX-UBTY].
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signal with a harmful message.18 While signal interference is ille-
gal and the agent can be arrested and prosecuted,19 prosecution
is rare because the agent may be embedded in a foreign coun-
try; in fact, the agent may be a foreign government using signal
interference for its own national security reasons.20 Further-
more, radio frequencies are in short supply and sometimes al-
igned too closely to forestall harmful interference.21
With the exception of Galileo, GNSS satellites are operated by
military authorities.22 U.S. GPS was the first position, navigation,
and timing (PNT) service and was designed for military use.23 It
did not become available to civilian airlines until after the 1983
Korean Airline Disaster.24 President Ronald Reagan realized
that the Korean airliner could have avoided entry into Russian
airspace if it could use the military’s satellite navigation system.25
The current availability of GNSS for civilian users is a huge ben-
efit. Military use is still considered a primary purpose for
GNSS,26 although civilian use far exceeds military use.27 Except
18 Id. at 3.
19 See, e.g., Quinten Plummer, FCC Fines Chinese Company Record $35 Million for




20 See, e.g., Yamada, supra note 6 (describing a GPS spoofing attack in the Black
Sea in 2017).
21 See In the Matter of LightSquared Tech. Working Grp. Report, 35 FCC Rcd.
3772, 3801–02 (2020). Previously, spectrum scarcity was handled by parceling out
closely aligned and duplicative frequencies across the globe to geostationary
satellites. See generally Harris, supra note 13. An issue arose when operators began
sending out multiple low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, which orbit the earth mul-
tiple times a day and potentially interfere with those geostationary satellites and
the PNT systems they support. Id.
22 Galileo Navigation Satellite System, GLOB. SEC., https://www.globalsecurity.org
/space/world/europe/nav.htm [https://perma.cc/JN84-5DYS].
23 The Author served on the U.S. government task forces established to make
GPS available for nongovernmental users after the 1983 Korean Airline disaster.
He has followed GNSS development since that time. See also Berenice Baker, A
Position in History: 25 Years of GPS, AIRFORCE TECH. (July 21, 2020), https://
www.airforce-technology.com/features/a-position-in-history-25-years-of-gps/
[https://perma.cc/T679-2PLT].
24 SCOTT PACE, GERALD FROST, IRVING LACHOW, DAVID FRELINGER, DONNA FOS-
SUM, DONALD K. WASSEM & MONICA PINTO, THE GLOBAL POSITION SYSTEM: ASSESS-
ING NATIONAL POLICIES 180 (1995).
25 Id.
26 See FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 340 (2d ed.
2018).
27 Id. Only 16% of GNSS use is for military purposes. Id.
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for Galileo, GNSS services are dual use (military and civilian).28
While military signals are encrypted, free civilian signals are not,
and thus are greatly exposed to harmful interference.29
There are four global GNSS in current use: GPS, GLONASS,
BeiDou, and Galileo.30 How do they interact? An airplane flying
in a western direction around the Earth starts out in China and
begins to navigate by the Chinese BeiDou system. As it ap-
proaches Russia, its navigation may automatically shift to the
Russian GLONASS system. Proceeding further west, it may shift
again to the EU Galileo system. On approaching the United
States, it may pick up the U.S. GPS. When it returns to China, it
may again use the Chinese BeiDou system. Each of the four sys-
tems is controlled by its government of origin.31 GNSS augmen-
tations, such as the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay
System (EGNOS) and the U.S. Wide Area Augmentation System
(WAAS), are available for landing at local airports.32
The four systems provide world-wide networks.33 There are
small differences in the number of satellites in each system, but
each GNSS consists of about 24–30 satellites.34 Fortunately, the
GNSS operators cooperate closely in the United Nations (U.N.)
General Assembly Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) International Committee on GNSS (ICG).35 Conse-
quently, all four GNSS have agreed to assist each other and be
interoperable.36 Most cell phones and many computers are
programmed to use any of the four systems. While this Article
will focus on all four GNSS, it will give special attention to inter-
ferences with the U.S. GPS.
28 Larsen, supra note 9, at 411.
29 Id. at 412.
30 Id. at 392.
31 Id. at 371 (“GPS, GLONASS, and BeiDou are controlled by their national
governments. Galileo is governed by the EU, but it is largely delegated to the
European Space Agency.”).
32 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 347.
33 See BeiDou Begins: China’s Home-Grown SatNav System Will Soon be Fully Func-
tional, ECONOMIST (July 18, 2020), https://www.economist.com/china/2020/07/
18/chinas-home-grown-satnav-system-will-soon-be-fully-functional [https://
perma.cc/3QKJ-4AR8].
34 GPS, Galileo, Beidou, Glonass . . . What Differences?, TELLER REP. (May 4, 2020,
5:41 AM), https://www.tellerreport.com/tech/2020-05-04-gps- -galileo- -beidou- -
glonass%E2%80%A6-what-differences-.BJ8vb_6FL.html [https://perma.cc/
N8MA-FMNE].
35 Larsen, supra note 9, at 371–72.
36 See id. at 372–73.
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GNSS is incorporated into virtually all military equipment.37
Besides its basic military uses, GNSS is essential for navigation of
airplanes, ships, cars, space objects, and agricultural vehicles.38
Previous navigation by reference to the stars is no longer a real-
istic option. There is increasing need for higher accuracy
GNSS.39 GNSS is now essential for timing financial transactions,
managing disasters, providing emergency health services, main-
taining all telecommunications functionality, and tracking peo-
ple, vehicles, and other moving objects.40 Surveyors need it for
accurate land measurement.41 It is an essential element of cell
phone and computer networks.42 Weather forecasting depends
on GNSS.43 The electric power grid is monitored by GNSS.44 In
short, “critical infrastructure” depends on GNSS.45 Loss of GNSS
due to interference with its signals would be globally
disastrous.46
This Article discusses several forms of interference with (1)
GNSS receivers; (2) GNSS satellites; and (3) in particular, the
radio-frequency spectrum used by the GNSS signals. Some
harmful interference is deliberate, but some radio interferences
have natural causes. For example, solar flares and solar radia-
tion may affect GNSS signals.47
37 Sarah M. Mountin, The Legality and Implications of Intentional Interference with
Commercial Communication Satellite Signals, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 101, 111 (2014).
38 Id. at 110–11.
39 Matteo Luccio, New Players Offering GNSS Correction Services, GPS WORLD (July
23, 2020), https://www.gpsworld.com/new-players-offering-gnss-correction-ser
vices/ [https://perma.cc/RK3Q-LXRD].
40 Mountin, supra note 37, at 111.
41 Surveying Using GPS And Conclusion, ANZLIC COMM. SURVEYING & MAPPING,
https://icsm.gov.au/education/fundamentals-mapping/surveying-mapping/sur
veying-using-gps-and-conclusion [https://perma.cc/Q49D-JFH4].
42 Mountin, supra note 37, at 111.
43 Id. at 112.
44 Id. at 103.
45 Exec. Order No. 13905, 85 Fed. Reg. 9359, 9359 (Feb. 12, 2020) (defining
critical infrastructure) (“Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to
the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets
would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic secur-
ity, national public health or safety, or on any combination of those matters.”); see
also Memorandum on Space Policy Directive-7, The United States Space-Based
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Policy (Jan. 15, 2021), https://
trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-space-policy-
directive-7/ [https://perma.cc/P2YU-HPEC].
46 Mountin, supra note 37, at 111.
47 Solar flares jam GNSS satellites facing the sun at the time of the eruption.
Space service companies position satellites in outer space to detect natural distur-
bances in outer space. See SATELLITE NAVIGATION & SPACE WEATHER: UNDERSTAND-
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Jamming and spoofing are illegal in the United States.48 As
described further below, the FCC primarily leads enforcement.49
Other agencies and actors also have enforcement interests.50
I. STAKEHOLDERS
A. NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
GNSS is global. The four governmental operators (United
States, Russia, China, and the EU) are each protective of their
respective system. All countries use GNSS, so all countries are all
anxious to preserve their access to and use of GNSS. Five U.S.
agencies are closely involved in regulating GNSS. U.S. govern-
mental GNSS interests, described below, are similar to interests
of other governments.
1. Military Authorities
GPS (the U.S. GNSS) is owned and operated by DOD.51 It was
originally designed exclusively for the military’s navigation and
warfighting purposes.52 Thus, U.S. military authorities have a
strong proprietary interest in GPS because it is an indispensable
part of guided missiles and many other military weapons.53 Mili-
tary authorities continue to administer and operate GPS.54 The
Deputy Secretary of Defense co-chairs the interagency PNT
Committee, which coordinates civilian GPS.55 The PNT Com-
mittee meets regularly to set U.S. governmental policy for
GPS.56 Civilian use now predominates GPS.57 However, the mili-
tary continues to control GPS.58
ING THE VULNERABILITY & BUILDING RESILIENCE, AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 27
(2011), https://www.ametsoc.org/ams/assets/file/spacwx_gps_2010.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/AZ7N-8WCR].
48 E.g., Plummer, supra note 19.
49 See supra Section III.C.
50 Id.
51 Paul B. Larsen, Regulation of Global Navigation and Positioning Services in the
United States, in NATIONAL REGULATION OF SPACE ACTIVITIES 459–65 (Ram S. Jakhu
ed., 2010).
52 Id. at 462.
53 Id.
54 Id.; 10 U.S.C. § 2281(a); see also LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 465.
55 National Executive Committee, GPS.GOV, https://www.gps.gov/governance/ex
com/ [https://perma.cc/EVJ3-3E82]; Memorandum on Space Policy Directive-7,
supra note 45.
56 Larsen, supra note 51, at 461.
57 See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 340.
58 Id.
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The military authorities in Russia and China also control their
GNSS; only the EU Galileo system is controlled by civilian au-
thorities.59 All military GNSS uses remain subject to interna-
tional and national military laws and regulations.60 Thus, GNSS
is subject to the U.N. Charter provisions on international peace
and security.61 Although the timing clocks on GPS satellites use
nuclear materials for accurate timing signals, GPS is not consid-
ered subject to the Outer Space Treaty (OST) prohibition on
placing nuclear materials in orbit.62 GPS is not considered a nu-
clear weapon.
Encrypted military signals are more difficult to seize and di-
vert than standard, unencrypted civilian signals. As a precaution,
U.S. military authorities are experimenting with alternate PNT
systems in case GPS suffers damage due to interference.63 States
involved in military conflicts may also deliberately interfere with
radio frequencies of enemy states.64 To avoid possible foreign
diversion of U.S. military GPS, DOD is protective of the radio
frequencies used for GPS signals.65 DOD also watches carefully
for any potential, harmful interference with GPS by commercial
users who compete for use of scarce radio frequencies.66 A re-
cent example of tension between military and civilian uses is
Ligado’s FCC application for use of frequencies that are so close
to nearby GPS signals that there could be harmful
interference.67
As a practical matter, GPS is generously funded by the U.S.
Congress as a military system.68 This funding includes research-
ing and building alternate systems based on different technol-
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 See, e.g., U.N. Charter arts. 39–51.
62 See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 4,
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter OST].
63 Yasmin Tadjdeh, Executive Order Seeks Stronger PNT Systems, NAT’L DEF. MAG.
(May 8, 2020), https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/5/8/
executive-order-seeks-stronger-pnt-systems [https://perma.cc/S2X7-LE7Y].
64 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 466.
65 See, e.g., In the Matter of LightSquared Tech. Working Grp. Report, 35 FCC
Rcd. 3772, 3783 (2020).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 3780; see also The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151–646
(establishing the FCC).
68 Program Funding, GPS.GOV, https://www.gps.gov/policy/funding/ [https://
perma.cc/7664-ATGU].
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ogy.69 By contrast, how likely is it that Congress might approve
such generous funding of a separate GNSS for civilians? The
current government has not indicated a willingness to spend the
money required to develop and build an alternate system based
on different technology.70
2. Department of Transportation
GNSS is an essential part of all transportation safety.71 Along
with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of
Transportation serves as PNT Committee co-chair.72 The U.S.
Congress appropriates funding for FAA to administer civilian
GPS air navigation activities.73 Thus, DOT (including FAA) has a
strong interest in GPS as an indispensable element of civilian air
safety.74 FAA’s air traffic control system depends on aircraft op-
erators being able to navigate safely using GPS.75 FAA also main-
tains WAAS, an augmented GPS system, which facilitates airport
landing.76 FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation is-
sues launch permits to operators of nongovernmental satel-
lites,77 which gives FAA additional interest in GNSS for safe
navigation of nongovernmental satellites. Furthermore, all
modes of transportation, especially driverless cars, now depend
on GPS for safe navigation.78
3. Department of Commerce
DOC’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ex-
amines and may approve applications for satellite remote sens-
ing,79 which provides DOC with a real interest in the assignment
69 Teresa Hitchens, House Strategic Forces Fences Space Force, SDA, GPS Funds,
BREAKING DEF. (June 22, 2020, 4:33 PM), https://breakingdefense.com/2020/
06/house-strategic-forces-fences-space-force-sda-gps-funds/ [https://perma.cc/
29JG-QSB5].
70 See Program Funding, supra note 68.
71 Larsen, supra note 9, at 388, 409 (describing GNSS aviation, marine, rail,
road, and highway applications).
72 National Executive Committee, supra note 55; Larsen, supra note 51, at 460.
73 Larsen, supra note 51, at 461.
74 Id. at 462; Memorandum on Space Policy Directive-7, supra note 45.
75 Mark Harris, FAA Files Reveal a Surprising Threat to Airline Safety: The U.S. Mili-
tary’s GPS Tests, IEEE SPECTRUM (Jan. 21, 2021), https://spectrum.ieee.org/aero-
space/aviation/faa-files-reveal-a-surprising-threat-to-airline-safety-the-us-militarys-
gps-tests [https://perma.cc/ZTN8-RHKY].
76 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 347.
77 Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, 51 U.S.C. §§ 50901–50923.
78 See generally Larsen, supra note 9; Larsen, supra note 51.
79 51 U.S.C. § 60134.
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of frequencies to remote sensing spacecraft. DOC’s National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology (NIST) establishes mea-
surement standards for communication with GPS receivers.80
The 2020 White House Executive Order (EO) on GPS (EO
13905) designated the Secretary of Commerce to lead the vital
effort of defining GPS elements and associated risks (also known
as PNT profiles).81 Additionally, DOC’s National Telecommuni-
cation Information Administration (NTIA)—independently
from the FCC—advises the President on federal communication
policy.82 Congress adopted 51 U.S.C. § 50112, designating DOC
to manage GPS and to “protect [the GPS electromagnetic] spec-
trum from disruption and interference.”83 Furthermore, Con-
gress designated the Secretary of Commerce to lead the
development of nongovernmental space policy regarding GPS.84
However, Congress has not appropriated the necessary funding
to DOC.85 DOC also has a seat on the PNT Committee.86
4. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
has an inherent interest in the safe operation and administra-
tion of all outer space activities.87 GNSS can be used to track and
facilitate the navigation of space objects.88 NASA also observes
the orbits of satellites to assure regularity of orbit.89 NASA is an
active member of the PNT Committee.90
80 About NIST, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., https://www.nist.gov/
about-nist [https://perma.cc/GSM3-2LKS].
81 Exec. Order No. 13905, 85 Fed. Reg. 9359, 9360 (Feb. 12, 2020); Memoran-
dum on Space Policy Directive-7, supra note 45.
82 About NTIA, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., https://www.ntia.doc.gov/
about [https://perma.cc/PHQ8-LJ94].
83 51 U.S.C. § 50112(3).
84 Id.
85 Program Funding, supra note 68.
86 National Executive Committee, supra note 55.
87 51 U.S.C. § 20112; see also National Aeronautics and Space Act, Pub. L. No.
85-568, 72 Stat. 426 (1958).
88 Satellite Safety, NASA, https://satellitesafety.gsfc.nasa.gov/ [https://
perma.cc/XW5J-2YFN].
89 Id.
90 Larsen, supra note 51, at 460.
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5. Department of Interior’s Government Disaster Management
The U.S. Geological Survey uses GNSS to track movements of
earthquakes and landslides.91 GNSS sensors on the ground can
communicate Earth movements to atomic clocks on satellites.92
A large network of these sensors is planted as part of the Pacific
Northwest Geodetic Array,93 which can measure Earth move-
ments as small as one-tenth of a millimeter.94 The U.S. Geologi-
cal Survey is part of the Department of Interior, which
participates in the PNT Committee.95
6. Federal Communications Commission
Radio frequencies are a scarce resource; the competition for
frequencies is fierce and highly regulated.96 GNSS and commer-
cial communication operators both require clear PNT signals.
The competition between their urgent needs for these signals
has resulted in several contests before the FCC, leaving the
agency to make close decisions, some of which keenly affect
GPS. For example, the FCC decision authorizing radio spectrum
use by Ligado upset GPS operators and users who feared possi-
ble radio interferences with their GPS assigned frequencies.97 In
its decision, the FCC stated that making the award to Ligado was
in the public interest.98 That the FCC (which is not part of the
executive branch) asserted its authority over military and
claimed national security interests remains a contentious issue.99
91 Paul B. Larsen, The OSO Landslide: Disaster Management Law in the Space Age,
40 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 335, 349 (2016).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 350.
95 National Executive Committee, supra note 55.
96 Harris, supra note 13.
97 In the Matter of LightSquared Tech. Working Grp. Report, 35 FCC Rcd.
3772, 3780 (2020); David Shepardson, U.S. Agencies Ask FCC to Rescind Ligado Spec-
trum Decision, REUTERS (May 22, 2020, 4:32 PM), https://www.reuters.com/arti
cle/us-usa-telecom-wireless/u-s-agencies-ask-fcc-to-rescind-ligado-spectrum-deci
sion-idUSKBN22Y2WI [https://perma.cc/V62U-LNN7]; Sandra Erwin, Coalition
of GPS User Groups Joins Fight Against FCC’s Ligado Decision, SPACENEWS (June 23,
2020), https://spacenews.com/coalition-of-gps-user-groups-joins-fight-against-
fccs-ligado-decision/ [https://perma.cc/FCB5-FKM5].
98 LightSquared, 35 FCC Rcd. at 3783.
99 See Univ. of Neb., NE Virtual Space Law Symposium: Spectrum Issues Before FCC
and ITU, MEDIAHUB (Oct. 7, 2020, 10:56AM), https://mediahub.unl.edu/media
/14616 (last visited June 2, 2021) (on file with the SMU Law Review Association)
(featuring Jennifer Manner, Senior Vice-President, Reg. Affs., Echostar; Ruth
Pritchard-Kelly, Vice-President, Reg. Affs., OneWeb; Jennifer Warren, Vice-Presi-
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The large number of governmental and nongovernmental par-
ties that participated in the Ligado FCC licensing proceeding
illustrates the variety of interests claiming a stake in the issue of
harmful radio-frequency interference.100
B. INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
1. International Telecommunication Union
Radio frequencies are an essential GNSS element. GNSS users
communicate with GNSS satellites via these frequencies, which
are a scarce global resource.101 The International Telecommuni-
cation Union (ITU) seeks to prevent harmful interference with
the radio frequencies.102 ITU keeps track of all radio-frequency
assignments in its global Master International Frequency Regis-
ter in accordance with the mandate of its Radio Regulations
which are treaty obligations for all ITU member states.103 Coun-
tries agree at the ITU World Radio Conferences to the ITU ta-
ble of frequency allocations.104 ITU works with national
government agencies, such as the FCC and NTIA, to implement
the findings of the ITU Radio Regulations Board.105 ITU views
GNSS from an international rather than a national point of
view; it seeks maximum tolerance as well as minimum interfer-
ence with radio frequencies.106
dent, Tech. Pol’y & Reg., Int’l Astronautical Fed’n). The Author attended this
symposium discussion and references are to his personal notes. See also Sandra
Erwin, Pentagon Presses on With Campaign to Overturn FCC’s Ligado Order,
SPACENEWS (May 25, 2020), https://spacenews.com/pentagon-presses-on-with-
campaign-to-overturn-fccs-ligado-order/ [https://perma.cc/DVR5-R54G].
100 In the Matter of LightSquared Tech. Working Grp. Report, 35 FCC Rcd.
3772 (2020).
101 Harris, supra note 13.
102 Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union art. 45, Dec.
22, 1992, 1825 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter ITU Constitution].
103 Radio Regulations of the Int’l Telecomm. Union art. 8.1 (2020 ed.) [here-
inafter ITU Radio Regulations], https://www.itu.int/en/myitu/Publications/
2020/09/02/14/23/Radio-Regulations-2020 [https://perma.cc/8KD4-KM3G].
104 See, e.g., id. art. 5.89 (explaining that “the use of the band 1 605-1 705 kHz
. . . is subject to the Plan established by the Regional Administrative Radio
Conference”).
105 E.g., LightSquared, 35 FCC Rcd. 3772.
106 ITU Constitution, supra note 102, art. 45; see also Larsen, supra note 9, at
379–83.
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2. United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
U.N. COPUOS is the international forum for discussion and
negotiation of all outer space issues.107 States meet in COPUOS
to implement the OST.108 COPUOS Guidelines promote the
Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities.109 The U.N.
Office of Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), which services
COPUOS, also administers the international registry of space
objects, including GNSS satellites.110 The COPUOS ICG meets
to facilitate interoperability, as well as individual GNSS
functionality.111
One nation’s—or its authorized nongovernmental entities’—
harmful interference with another nation’s GNSS radio fre-
quencies for military and national security reasons may involve
the U.N. Security Council, which is tasked with resolving acts of
aggression and other threats to the peace.112 Multilateral discus-
sions of military issues may be discussed in the U.N. Disarma-
ment Conference.113 Both institutions are therefore interested
organizations. However, military GNSS interference issues have
not been raised in either of these two fora as of December 2020.
3. International Civil Aviation Organization
Chicago Convention requires the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) to regulate international navigation of air-
planes.114 Consequently, ICAO has sought to regulate GNSS be-
cause the instruments used in air navigation require GNSS.115
All GNSS services must conform with the ICAO flight stan-




109 Rep. of the Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on Its Sixty-Second
Session, U.N. Doc. A/74/20, annex II (June 12–21 2019).
110 See United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space, U.N. OFF. FOR
OUTER SPACE AFFS., https://unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index
.html [https://perma.cc/EK2W-VNJF].
111 Larsen, supra note 9, at 395–97.
112 U.N. Charter arts. 34–35; see also Mountin, supra note 37, at 189.
113 About Us, U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFFS., https://www.un.org/disarma
ment/about/ [https://perma.cc/QC2G-LAK3].
114 Convention on International Civil Aviation Part II, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
115 See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 354.
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dards.116 GNSS receivers on airplanes may receive GNSS signals
from any of the four GNSS depending on which is nearest.117
GNSS has been in use by airplanes since the Korean Airline
disaster in 1983.118 It is now absolutely essential for air naviga-
tion.119 The 1998 ICAO Assembly adopted the Charter on the
Rights and Obligations of States Relating to GNSS Services.120 It
provides that (1) aviation safety is the most important purpose
of GNSS; (2) aircraft shall have non-discriminatory use of GNSS;
and (3) GNSS operators “shall ensure the continuity, availabil-
ity, integrity, accuracy and reliability of such services.”121 ICAO’s
charter is not binding because aviation must share GNSS service
with all non-aviation users, including those over which ICAO has
no authority.122 Nevertheless, ICAO continues to take a special
interest in GNSS and asserts itself on air safety issues related to
GNSS navigation.123
4. International Maritime Organization
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has a vital
interest in promoting GNSS use for navigation of ships.124 Based
on the IMO Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization, the IMO has established standards
for navigation of ships.125 International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea regulations specifically require ships to be
equipped with a GNSS receiver.126 Maritime industry operators
have urged IMO to protect shipping from GNSS jamming and
spoofing.127
116 Id.
117 See infra Part I.
118 PACE ET AL., supra note 24, at 180.
119 Per Enge, Nick Enge, Todd Walter & Leo Eldredge, Aviation Benefits from
Satellite Navigation, 20 NEW SPACE, no. 20, 2014, at 1, 1.
120 Int’l Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO] Assembly Res. A32-19, Charter on
the Rights and Obligations of States Relating to GNSS Services (1998), in Assem-
bly Resolutions in Force, at V-8, ICAO Doc. 10022 (Oct. 4, 2013), https://
www.icao.int/publications/Documents/10022_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9EU-
RBAF].
121 Id. at V-9.
122 See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 354.
123 See Int’l Civil Aviation Org., Working Paper: An Urgent Need to Address
Harmful Interferences to GNSS, ICAO Doc. A40-WP/188 (May 8, 2019).
124 Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO] Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization art. 1, Mar. 6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 621.
125 Id. arts. 16(i), 22(a).
126 Yamada, supra note 6, at 40.
127 Id. at 42.
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5. World Meteorological Organization
The World Meteorological Organization has a stake in GNSS
because it depends on GNSS to measure water moisture in the
atmosphere.128 Weather forecasting is linked to water vapor con-
centration in the atmosphere.129
6. European Union and the European Space Agency
The EU, consisting of twenty-seven European states, owns
Galileo.130 The European Space Agency manages Galileo for the
EU’s extensive infrastructure.131 EU air traffic control uses a
GNSS augmenting system called EGNOS—similar to the U.S.
WAAS—for airport landings.132 Thus, the EU has a significant
GNSS stake.
C. NONGOVERNMENTAL GNSS USERS
1. Industry
The list of interested nongovernmental users of GNSS is ex-
tensive because GNSS has become such a large part of the
world’s social and economic infrastructure.133 Both airlines and
individual airplane and drone operators that navigate by use of
GNSS are vitally interested, as both are totally dependent on
GNSS.134 Even low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellite operators benefit
from GNSS for the navigation of their satellites.135 Any interfer-
ence with the GNSS radio signals may result in severe acci-
128 World Meteorological Organization [WMO], Report No. 92: Instruments
and Observing Methods, WMO/TD-No. 1340 (2006), https://library.wmo.int/
doc_num.php?explnum_id=9329 [https://perma.cc/47PU-T2V8].
129 Macrotrends Affecting GNSS Across Market Segments, EUR. GLOB. NAVIGATION
SATELLITE SYS. AGENCY GNSS MKT. REP., no. 6, 2019, at 18, 20, https://
www.gsa.europa.eu/system/files/reports/market_report_issue_6_v2.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/ARL8-5KA5].
130 Larsen, supra note 51, at 369; Countries, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/
european-union/about-eu/countries_en [https://perma.cc/MJ3P-FEGB].
131 Galileo, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/space/
galileo/ [https://perma.cc/C4S5-ZAMZ].
132 See Galileo and EGNOS, EUR. SPACE AGENCY, https://www.esa.int/Applica-
tions/Navigation/Galileo_and_EGNOS [https://perma.cc/2ESS-2RZX]; EGNOS




133 Mountin, supra note 37, at 103.
134 Id. at 111, 120.
135 Id. at 120.
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dents.136 Like airplanes and drones, ships cannot easily navigate
without GNSS.137 GNSS signal interference is extremely danger-
ous to ships and ship operators.138 The communication net-
works use GPS for timing.139 Financiers of airplanes, ships, cars,
and all other GNSS-dependent instruments rely on GNSS sig-
nals.140 Stock exchanges require the exact time of stock
purchases and transfers; they would also suffer from GNSS sig-
nals interference.141
2. Individual Users
Most individuals may not realize the extent to which their
daily lives depend on GPS. Car drivers depend on GPS to locate
their destinations.142 Rescue services, like On-Star for car driv-
ers, rely on GPS.143 Individual stock transactions are timed by
GP via their electric grid.144 However, the GPS signal may easily
be disrupted. A sudden collapse of GPS by jamming or spoofing
would quickly bring GNSS dependence to individual users’ con-
sciousness.145 Thus, a number of options for greater GPS system
security, as well as possible alternative technology, must be
considered.
The Civil GPS Service Interface Committee (CGSIC) is an im-
portant general government forum for civilian GNSS users to
learn about GPS operations and new developments.146 The CG-
SIC, sponsored by the DOT and Coast Guard, holds a public
meeting every year where military and civilian experts describe
current GPS developments to the general public.147 This meet-
ing also provides an opportunity for members of the public to
be heard.148 CGSIC solicits individual contributions regarding
the GPS network from GPS users around the world.149 It has
136 Id.




141 Id. at 111, 120.




146 Civil GPS Service Interface Committee, GPS.GOV, https://www.gps.gov/cgsic/
[https://perma.cc/6Q4C-QEZ5]; Memorandum on Space Policy Directive-7,
supra note 45.
147 Civil GPS Service Interface Committee, supra note 146.
148 Id.
149 Id.
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formed specialized subcommittees.150 CGSIC presents a unique
opportunity for individual users to inform the U.S. government,
which operates GPS, about problems with jamming, spoofing,
and other harmful interference.151 The existence of CGSIC
should continue if the major civilian oversight of GPS is shifted
from DOT to the DOC as envisioned by EO 13905.152
3. Competitors
Commercial satellite operators compete with GNSS for the
use of radio spectrum. The challenges raised to Ligado’s author-
ization to use adjacent frequencies for mobile communication
illustrate (1) the scarcity of the radio-frequency source, and (2)
the need for the FCC, as the government regulator, to make
decisions that are in the public interest.153 Ligado and similarly
situated companies are interested in obtaining spectrum that
military operators of GPS would prefer to have without chal-
lenge.154 The outcome of this challenge is discussed further in
Part IV.155
4. Nongovernmental Associations
The Institute of Navigation (ION) is the largest nongovern-
mental association specially focused on promoting the uses of
GNSS.156 Its members, including individual and corporate na-
tional and international GNSS users, meet every year to discuss
new GNSS technology and applications, as well as to exchange
ideas about how to avoid radio interference.157 Members also
include those involved in manufacturing both civilian and mili-
150 Id. The 2020 CGSIC meeting included sessions and reports by International
Subcommittees for International Information, Timing, and Surveying-Mapping-
Geosciences. See Agenda: 60th Meeting of the Civil GPS Service Interface Committee,
supra note 12.
151 Civil GPS Interface Committee, supra note 146.
152 See Exec. Order No. 13905, 85 Fed. Reg. 9359 (Feb. 12, 2020); Marcia
Smith, New Executive Orders for GPS, Space Council, SPACE POL’Y ONLINE (Feb. 15,
2020), https://www.spacepolicyonline.com/news/new-executive-orders-for-gps-
space-council/ [https://perma.cc/5A4J-EAG3]; Memorandum on Space Policy
Directive-7, supra note 45.
153 See In the Matter of LightSquared Tech. Working Grp. Report, 35 FCC Rcd.
3772, 3842 (2020); Shepardson, supra note 97; Erwin, supra note 97.
154 LightSquared and GPS, supra note 8.
155 See infra Part IV.
156 About the Institute of Navigation, INST. OF NAVIGATION, https://www.ion.org/
about/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/LD9H-6BLM].
157 Id.
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tary GNSS instruments.158 In addition to professional meetings
for all members, ION also organizes specialized meetings for
groups of members (e.g., meetings for all ION members con-
cerned with military GNSS).159
The German Institute of Navigation is also focused on pro-
moting GNSS.160 It sponsors the European Navigation Confer-
ence, which educates members on the latest GNSS
technologies.161 The conference is an excellent forum for ex-
changing ideas and information.
The International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Asso-
ciation (IFATCA), International Federation of Air Line Pilots’
Associations (IFALPA), and International Air Transport Associa-
tion (IATA), represent the views of their members in various
fora.162 In 2019, they jointly asked ICAO to resolve jamming and
spoofing issues experienced by the aviation industry.163
D. CONCLUSION
GNSS has become an integral part of the national and inter-
national economic and social infrastructure. It is an essential
utility like electricity or the internet. Virtually all people now
depend on GNSS signal availability to conduct their lives. Thus,
GNSS must be protected. If it is not possible to make the current
GNSS dependable, then another technology must take its place.
II. GNSS JAMMING, SPOOFING, AND OTHER HARMFUL
SPECTRUM INTERFERENCES
GNSS signals are easily overpowered due to the weakness of
the radio-frequency signal emitted from GNSS satellites. Jam-
ming and spoofing attempts to disrupt the already weak signal.
Military GNSS is more difficult to jam due to its encryption, but
civilian GNSS is not encrypted and thus easily subject to interfer-
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Our Mission, GER. INST. OF NAVIGATION, https://www.dgon.de/en/about-
us/our-mission.html [https://perma.cc/2RHA-8AC2].
161 European Navigation Conference 2020, GER. INST. OF NAVIGATION, https://
www.enc2020.eu/en/home/ [https://perma.cc/7BV2-G55D].
162 Partners and Supporters, INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG., https://www.icao.int/
Meetings/AMC/NGAP/Pages/Partners.aspx [https://perma.cc/LQL6-NGSR].
163 See Int’l Civil Aviation Org., supra note 123, at 1.
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ence.164 All four GNSS are almost equally prone to interfer-
ence.165 Because of the desire to make GNSS interoperable,
information about their signals is released, making them more
easily accessible.166 All GNSS signals are of approximately the
same, weak strength.167 Individuals, criminal gangs, and govern-
ment actors have all been implicated in distorting signals.168
Motivations include sheer convenience, theft of valuables, or
military advantages.169 One recent study found 500,000 GNSS
frequency transmissions should not have been transmitted; ap-
proximately 10% of those transmissions were malicious and in-
tentional, while the others may have been accidental, perhaps
caused by signal testing or solar storms.170
A. JAMMING
Jamming is “harmful interference” with radio frequencies.171
By overpowering the weak GNSS signals with stronger signals,
jamming can occur in two ways.172 The first (terrestrial jam-
ming) involves interference with signal receivers on Earth.173 Al-
ternatively, orbital jamming involves a conflicting signal
drowning out the original signal to prevent it from reaching the
satellite to be rebroadcast to users.174 Therefore, “whereas orbi-
tal jamming effects can extend throughout a satellite’s entire
footprint, terrestrial jamming effects can be localized and lim-
ited to specific targets.”175
The flow of the radio-frequency signal from the GNSS satellite
to the GNSS receiver need only be interrupted sporadically in
order to make the message meaningless.176 The sporadic radio-
frequency interruption accomplishes total communications in-
164 Larsen, supra note 9, at 412. European Galileo GNSS is not a military opera-
tor, but has a limited high-level encrypted service available for payment. Id. at
369, 386–87.
165 Datta, supra note 6.
166 Id.
167 Id. All GNSS are in medium-Earth orbit (MEO). PAUL D. GROVES, PRINCI-
PLES OF GNSS, INERTIAL, AND MULTISENSOR INTEGRATED NAVIGATION SYSTEMS 300
(2d ed. 2013).
168 Datta, supra note 6.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Mountin, supra note 37, at 129.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 130.
174 Id. at 129–30.
175 Id. at 130.
176 See id. at 129.
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terruption.177 Military authorities may physically jam a GNSS sig-
nal for national security reasons.178 Or civilians may jam a signal
to gain some kind of advantage or to create havoc.179 GNSS
maintenance can also result in accidental or deliberate signal
interference.180 Radio-frequency jamming has occurred for
many years. For example, during World War II, Germany
jammed British Broadcasting Corporation radio broadcasts to
German-occupied countries.181
B. SPOOFING
Spoofing is seizing control of a radio frequency and substitut-
ing a message different from the one in transit to or from the
GNSS satellite.182 Spoofing then tricks the end user by providing
a fake signal that mimics a true signal’s characteristics.183 It oc-
curs widely in telephone advertising, when outsiders pretending
to be local businesses appear to call from a local area code.184
Additionally, spoofing may occur in television broadcasting. In
1986, a disgruntled viewer managed to capture and replace a
television broadcast with his own message.185 In 2002, a Falung
Gong broadcast hijacked a Chinese satellite television transmis-
sion to broadcast its own message.186 A government may also
spoof to mislead ships or airplanes by giving pilots misleading
geolocation information.187 Or, spoofing may lead away from
sensitive national security places or persons, like the ruler of a
country.188
177 Id. at 129–30.
178 See id. at 125.
179 See id. at 121.
180 Id. at 104.
181 BBC Broadcast Information About Britain’s Military Setbacks to Win Hearts and
Minds in Germany During World War II, UNIV. OF EXETER, https://www.exeter.
ac.uk/news/research/title_579867_en.html [https://perma.cc/GT4R-6BYP].
182 Mountin, supra note 37, at 130.
183 Id.
184 See Caller ID Spoofing, FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/spoofing
[https://perma.cc/CK2Q-YPPJ].
185 See Associated Press, Video Pirate Interrupts HBO, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 1986),
https://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/28/arts/video-pirate-interrupts-hbo.html
[https://perma.cc/2HS4-7NG4].
186 Jail for Falun Gong TV Hackers, CNN (Sept. 20, 2002, 7:33 AM), https://
edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/09/20/china.falun.gong/
[https://perma.cc/ZPB4-CBFG].
187 See Mountin, supra note 37, at 106.
188 Kyle Mizokami, Report: Russia Engaging in Widespread Satellite Navigation
Spoofing, POPULAR MECHS. (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.popularmechanics.com/
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GNSS spoofing is more dangerous than jamming.189 It substi-
tutes false signals for the proper GNSS satellites signals, thus
guiding the operators of GNSS receivers into wrong direc-
tions.190 The European Space Agency suggests wide monitoring
of all GNSS receivers to detect interference with GNSS
signals.191
Extensive jamming and spoofing activities originate from mili-
tary authorities, who consider outer space to be a warfighting
domain.192 The space powers (the United States, Russia, China,
and, lately, India) compete for military dominance of outer
space.193 Reliance on outer space for warfighting leads the space
powers to develop ways to jam, deceive, degrade, and deny ac-
cess to GNSS.194 These capabilities affect both military and civil-
ian GNSS users. The OST prohibits the space powers from
stationing weapons of mass destruction in outer space.195 Thus,
the space powers currently concentrate on warfighting from
Earth’s surface by engaging in electronic warfare such as jam-
ming, spoofing, and other GNSS interference techniques.196
military/weapons/a27032602/report-russia-engaging-in-widespread-satellite-navi-
gation-spoofing/ [https://perma.cc/HS3H-2KA3].
189 Datta, supra note 6.
190 Id.
191 GIDAS: Real-Time Interference Detection Making Satnav Safer, EUR. SPACE
AGENCY (July 20, 2020), https://www.esa.int/Applications/Navigation/GIDAS_
Real-time_interference_detection_making_satnav_safer [https://perma.cc/
U53Y-VDJA].
192 Woodrow Bellamy III, Are GPS Jamming Incidents a Growing Problem for Avia-
tion?, AVIATION TODAY (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.aviationtoday.com/2017/01/
31/are-gps-jamming-incidents-a-growing-problem-for-aviation/ [https://perma.
cc/MD7PA9QB]; see also Bill Carey, Aviation Groups Seek Action on Global Naviga-
tion Vulnerability, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH. (Sept. 26, 2019), https://avia
tionweek.com/air-transport/aviation-groups-seek-action-gnss-vulnerability
[https://perma.cc/CU3F-H2HX].
193 See SECURE WORLD FOUND., GLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES: AN OPEN




195 OST, supra note 62, art. IV. The OST also prohibits placing weapons of
mass destruction in orbit. Id.
196 Ingo Baumann, GNSS Cybersecurity Threats: An International Law Perspective,
INSIDE GNSS (June 3, 2019), https://insidegnss.com/gnss-cybersecurity-threats-
an-international-law-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/4EGE-6S99]. GNSS is not
considered a weapon of mass destruction. See Weapons of Mass Destruction, U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Aug. 14, 2008), https://www.dhs.gov/topic/weapons-
mass-destruction [https://perma.cc/WM8V-AWF4].
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The United States has announced that it is preparing for war
in outer space and considers outer space to be a “warfighting
domain.”197 To that end, the United States has established the
U.S. Space Force to focus specifically on outer space warfare.198
DOD’s Counter Communication System is developing ways to
jam and spoof GNSS satellites.199 The Naval Warfare Program
can now frustrate adversaries by blocking GNSS use in local ar-
eas.200 The program sometimes tests its capabilities by engaging
in extensive jamming during naval exercises in waters and land
of the southeastern United States.201
Russia is also focused on outer space as a warfighting do-
main.202 Thus, in competition with the United States, Russia has
similarly established a special military Space Force for outer
space warfare.203 Russia has developed a large variety of ways to
jam and spoof the flow of information on GNSS satellites and
receivers.204 Russia has also indicated that it has the capability to
misguide both ships and airplanes, including unmanned air-
planes.205 The Russian Army has electronic warfare capability fo-
cusing on GNSS receivers in specific localities—for example, the
immediate environment around President Vladimir Putin, in-
cluding wherever he travels.206 Russia is able to jam and spoof
communication in large areas—for example, near the Eastern
Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea off southern Russia.207
China, like the United States and Russia, has designated outer
space as a military domain with the objective of achieving Chi-
nese military dominance in outer space.208 China has developed
197 SECURE WORLD FOUND., supra note 193, at 3-20; see also Agenda: 60th Meeting
of the Civil GPS Service Interface Committee, supra note 12; Civ. GPS Serv. Interface
Comm., Keynote Address, at 12:02, YOUTUBE (Sept. 22, 2020), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?t=722&v=Rr11pyY79-M&feature=youtu.be (last visited
June 2, 2021) (featuring Maj. Gen. John E. Shaw, Combined Force Space Compo-
nent Commander, U.S. Space Command, and Commander, Space Operations
Command, U.S. Space Force). Major General Shaw predicted massive wartime
GNSS jamming. Civ. GPS Serv. Interface Comm., supra.
198 SECURE WORLD FOUND., supra note 193, at 3-20 to -21.
199 Id. at 3-11.
200 Id. at 3-12.
201 Id. at 3-13.
202 Id. at xiii.
203 Id. at 2-29.
204 Id. at 2-19.
205 See id. at 2-17 to -18.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 2-18.
208 Id. at 1-1.
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electronic warfare capability to deter foreign aggression.209 To-
ward that purpose, China jams GNSS signals to control access to
PNT data.210 For example, the Chinese military authorities are
reported to have jammed GNSS in the South China Sea.211 Chi-
nese military authorities are also reported to have engaged in
spoofing in the Shanghai area.212
Iran is also capable of engaging in electronic interference
with GNSS signals.213 On several occasions it has demonstrated
an ability to interfere with civilian GNSS signals.214
GPS jamming affects not only military activities but also frus-
trates civilians. In 2017, the police in northern Norway noticed
GNSS signals were being jammed.215 The Norwegian National
Security Agency investigation found that the GNSS signal jam-
ming originated in Russia.216 Twenty ships lost navigation in the
Black Sea due to local Russian spoofing of their GNSS receivers,
endangering the people on board the ships.217 One London Ec-
onomics study estimated that spoofing events in the maritime
sector could potentially cause losses totaling over one billion
dollars.218 A similar spoofing event happened near Moscow,
where people were charged for transportation services for which
they had not contracted.219 Spoofing is extensive. From 2016 to
2018, ten thousand spoofing events involving 1,300 ships were
reported.220
Spoofing and jamming are intense in the eastern parts of the
Mediterranean Sea, which is related to the military conflicts in
the Middle East.221 The Mediterranean entrance to the Suez Ca-
nal has been particularly spoofed.222 Airline pilots complained
to the ICAO that false GNSS signals endangered airline access to
209 Id.
210 Id. at x.
211 Id. at 1-16.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 6-3.
214 Id.
215 Peter Bakkemo Danilov, GPS Jamming Still Causing Problems in Finnmark,
HIGH N. NEWS (June 26, 2020), https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/gps-jam
ming-still-causing-problems-finnmark [https://perma.cc/ZJ3X-LEM6].
216 Id.
217 Yamada, supra note 6, at 40.
218 See id.
219 Milner, supra note 6.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Carey, supra note 192, at 32.
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Israeli airports.223 Airplanes flying at high altitudes reported that
their GNSS signals were being overpowered by strong “fake” sig-
nals from a military airbase in Syria.224 Consequently, the ICAO
Regional Aviation Safety Group for the Middle East has warned
airplane operators about spoofing and jamming in the area.225
“[T]he nonprofit organization [Center for Advanced Defense
Studies] used data from a GPS receiver on the International
Space Station to detect GPS spoofing in Syria by the Russian
military for airspace denial purposes.”226
There are also existing reports of jamming and spoofing in
Asia.227 Ships arriving in Shanghai and other ports off the east-
ern coast of China reported that the GNSS signals of three hun-
dred commercial ships showed an incorrect location for those
ships.228
The spoofing and jamming perpetrators appear to be both
military and non-military as the objectives of these events vary.229
While military authorities influence the military conflict in the
Middle East, the civilian purpose may be to defraud or smuggle
illegal supplies into a country.230 The technology is very simple
and does not require sophisticated military software.231
In 2019, the IFATCA, IFALPA, and IATA jointly urged the
ICAO Assembly to (1) avoid jamming and spoofing dangers to
air safety; (2) warn military authorities that their operations ad-
versely affect the air safety of civilian aircraft flight; (3) protect
GNSS radio frequencies as mandated by ITU radio regulations;
and (4) support alternative air navigation technology.232 The
University of Texas reported research estimates spoofing signals
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C. ENFORCEMENT OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY HARMFUL
INTERFERENCE
1. International Telecommunication Union
ITU is a treaty organization.234 Virtually all countries in the
world are members of ITU.235 ITU regulates the radio frequen-
cies used for GNSS signals.236 Article 44 of the ITU Constitution
requires ITU to administer the allocation of radio frequencies as
“limited natural resources” which must be used in accordance
with ITU Radio Regulations.237 ITU has, by virtue of the ITU
Constitution, legal authority over the entire radio-frequency
spectrum.238 And ITU, which requires stations be established
and operated to avoid significant “harmful interference” with ra-
dio frequencies used by other countries, maintains a register of
all radio frequencies in use.239
ITU administers the radio frequencies through its radio regu-
lations.240 Interference with registered radio frequencies is con-
trary to the ITU Radio Regulations.241 Article 15 of the ITU
Radio Regulations prohibits “transmission of superfluous sig-
nals, or the transmission of false or misleading signals, or the
transmission of signals without identification.”242 However,
States have not been willing to give ITU effective authority to
administer its registered frequencies.243 Allocations are thus
only enforced through ITU’s control over the Master Interna-
tional Frequency Register and its refusal to register assignments
that would cause significant harmful interference.244 Member
states enforce harmful interference restrictions based on treaty
obligations.245 The FCC represents the United States in ITU and
234 See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 194.
235 Id. at 195.
236 Id. at 192. The ITU Radio Regulations Board administers the Master Inter-
national Frequency Register as provided by the organization’s constitution. ITU
Constitution, supra note 102, art. 14.
237 ITU Constitution, supra note 102, art. 44.
238 Id.
239 Id. arts. 14, 45.
240 Id. art. 44; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 192.
241 ITU Constitution, supra note 102, art. 45.
242 ITU Radio Regulations, supra note 103, art. 15.1.
243 Mountin, supra note 37, at 122.
244 Id. at 134.
245 Id.
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obtains ITU-cleared radio frequencies for assignment to United
States operators.246
2. FCC Enforcement of Harmful Interference
Administration and enforcement responsibilities fall primarily
on the national governments, supplemented by the efforts of in-
dividual users. The FCC enforces the prohibition on harmful
interference with GNSS signals.247 A typical FCC enforcement
example involved Gary Bojczak, a construction company em-
ployee who inadvertently jammed GPS at Newark Liberty Inter-
national Airport.248 He had acquired a cheap jamming device
for his truck “to keep his boss from tracking his whereabouts at
all times.”249 Unknown to him, the device also jammed GPS at
the airport.250 An FCC agent, using a tracking device, located his
truck and its illegal jamming device.251 Based on its investiga-
tion, the FCC issued the driver a fine of $31,875.00.252 Seizing
control of a satellite is a crime.253
3. U.S. Criminal Enforcement
The 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act254 prohib-
ited interference with radio frequencies used for communica-
tion with satellites, which is now considered a felony and
enforced by the U.S. Department of Justice.255 The Act protects
electronic communication and electronically stored data.256
246 International, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., https://www.ntia.doc.gov/
category/international [https://perma.cc/8P87-3S89].
247 Jammer Enforcement, FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/enforce-
ment [https://perma.cc/JWM8-PST7].
248 In re Gary P. Bojczak, 28 FCC Rcd. 11589 (2013); see also Raymond Fisman &
Tim Sullivan, How GPS Transformed Trucking and Made the Open Road a Lot Less
Open, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 23, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-
ATWORKB-1367 [https://perma.cc/C738-D2G4].
249 Fisman & Sullivan, supra note 248.
250 Id.
251 In re Gary P. Bojczak, 18 FCC Rcd. at 11590. GNSS jamming violates 47
U.S.C. §§ 301, 302(b), 333. Id. at 11591.
252 Id. at 11594. The FCC also prosecutes the sale of jamming devices. See In re
Supply Room, Inc., 28 FCC Rcd. 4981 (2013). The Cyber Security Principles for
Space Systems, published in the Federal Register, seek to protect against jam-
ming and spoofing, but they do not establish new enforcement sanctions. See
Cybersecurity Principles for Space Systems, 85 Fed. Reg. 56155 (Sept. 4, 2020).
253 18 U.S.C. § 1367.
254 Id. §§ 2510–2523.
255 See id. § 2511(2)(g)(iv).
256 Id. § 2510(12).
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4. Harmful Interference Related to National Security by Agents of
Foreign Governments
Government interference with GNSS signals is a different mat-
ter. Government authorities interfere with the use of radio fre-
quencies if they determine that interference is in their national
interests.257 One state’s jamming and spoofing can affect an-
other state’s national security and sovereignty, causing a respon-
sive intervention. One author, Sarah Mountin, suggests that
retaliation against another state can be legally justified if one
country seriously affects another state by jamming or spoofing
“fake” information.258 Interference with military objectives may
justify military response.259 Possible retaliation is limited by U.N.
Charter Article 2, which requires states to refrain from use of
force or threats of use of force “inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations.”260 For example, deliberate interference
with a commercial airplane’s GNSS navigation, resulting in a
crash and killing hundreds of passengers, could constitute ille-
gal use of force, thus justifying retaliation.261 Likewise, jamming
or spoofing GNSS signals in violation of basic space law and ITU
Radio Regulations to cause a satellite’s destruction could be
considered an armed attack that would also justify retaliation.262
Similarly, Mountin asserts that intense GNSS spoofing and jam-
ming, which critically disturbs state infrastructure, could justify
legal use of retaliatory force.263 Nevertheless, states are reluctant
to react to jamming and spoofing because they may wish to en-
gage in such acts themselves, or they may wish to avoid causing
international tensions.264
GNSS interference by nongovernmental agencies does not
trigger Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, which applies only to ac-
tions by states.265 An exception would exist if the interference
can be traced to a state.266 OST Article VI provides that:
257 Mountin, supra note 37, at 105.
258 Id. at 105–06, 130, 156–57, 173. The principle of non-intervention was clari-
fied by the ICJ in Nicaragua v. United States. Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 106 (June 27).
259 Mountin, supra note 37, at 162.
260 U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
261 Mountin, supra note 37, at 172, 177.
262 Id. at 177.
263 Id. at 177–78.
264 Id. at 178.
265 Id. at 179.
266 Id.
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States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility
for national activities in outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by
governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for
assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with
the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.267
This provision could make states responsible for GNSS interfer-
ence by nongovernmental entities.268
5. International Settlement of Disputes About Harmful Interferences
OST Article IX provides:
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity
or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, in-
cluding the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause poten-
tially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in
the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate
international consultations before proceeding with any such ac-
tivity or experiment.269
In her study of harmful interference, Mountin traced Article
IX’s reference to harmful interference to the famous U.S. West
Ford Experiments in 1961 and 1963, which deposited 500,000
copper metal needles into orbit to test the effect on global com-
munication.270 Some of the needles still remain in orbit as space
debris.271 The experiments caused international protests, which
were expressed in OST Article IX.272 Mountin suggests that jam-
ming and spoofing could justify offended states invoking OST
Article IX to request consultation.273 However, as of the time of
this writing, no state has invoked Article IX, despite repeated
instances of harmful interference.274
267 OST, supra note 62, art. VI.
268 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 60.
269 OST, supra note 62, art. IX. (emphasis added).
270 Mountin, supra note 37, at 148–49; William W. Ward & Franklin W. Floyd,
Thirty Years of Space Communications Research and Development at Lincoln Laboratory,
NASA HIST. DIV., https://history.nasa.gov/SP-4217/ch8.htm [https://perma.cc/
QZK4-E7JD].
271 West Ford Needles: Where Are They Now?, 17 ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, Oct.
2013, at 1, 3–4, https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/quarterly-news/pdfs/odqnv17
i4.pdf [https://perma.cc/A588-BHTK].
272 Mountin, supra note 37, at 149–50.
273 Id. at 150.
274 Id. at 150–51.
34 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [86
The OST Article III reference to the U.N. Charter and other
international law makes relevant the possibility of dispute settle-
ment by the U.N.275 The OST does not in any way delimit dis-
pute settlement by the U.N. Security Council, because Article
103 of the U.N. Charter supersedes all other international law in
case of conflicts.276
III. FCC’S ORDER REGARDING POSSIBLE HARMFUL
INTERFERENCE WITH GPS FREQUENCIES BY
LIGADO
Nongovernmental entities cannot represent themselves in
ITU. The Department of State represents the United States, but
the FCC interacts on behalf of U.S. nongovernmental entities.277
The FCC is an independent U.S. government agency.278 47
U.S.C. §§ 301 and 307 authorize the FCC to assign ITU-cleared
frequencies based on what it finds to be in the public interest.279
Ascertaining the public interest is a wide-ranging search, which
is becoming increasingly more extensive.
The 2020 FCC Ligado ruling was seventeen years in the mak-
ing.280 Ligado plans to establish a high-tech (5G) communica-
tion system using low-power signals similar to the GPS system.281
The problem is whether Ligado’s frequencies are too close to
the existing GPS frequencies, which might cause harmful inter-
ference.282 As previously discussed, GPS needs to have radio fre-
quencies that are free of radio interference in order to send
unhindered signals to GPS receivers. Therefore, the FCC
needed to answer whether this assignment of radio frequencies
would cause harmful interference with the radio frequencies al-
located to GPS.283
275 OST, supra note 62, art. III.
276 U.N. Charter art. 103.
277 See International Telecommunication Union Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R),
INT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., https://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/osmhome/
international/ITUR.html [https://perma.cc/RJ77-Y867].
278 What We Do, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/what-we-do [https://
perma.cc/MD2J-RM7Z].
279 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 307(b).
280 See In the Matter of LightSquared Tech. Working Grp. Report, 35 FCC Rcd.
3772, 3774 (2020) (“The genesis of this proceeding, however, dates back to
2003.”).
281 Datta, supra note 6.
282 Id.
283 See id.
2021] HARMFUL INTERFERENCE BRING GPS DOWN? 35
The Ligado case raises a policy issue for the United States that
other countries also encounter—meeting the demands of com-
mercial systems by using frequencies close to those of existing
services. The radio spectrum is a scarce resource, and there is
competition for its use.284 In the Ligado case, the competition
was primarily between a commercial communication company
and DOD, an executive branch government agency.285 The FCC,
which is not part of the executive branch, but an independent
government agency governed by its own laws, decided the is-
sue.286 The executive branch agencies were represented by the
NTIA, located in the executive branch’s DOC.287 The Communi-
cations Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 305 and 902, delegates to the NTIA
authority over radio stations “belonging to and operated by the
United States,” whereas 47 U.S.C. §§ 303 and 301 delegates to
the FCC legal authority to license and regulate nongovernmen-
tal uses of the radio spectrum.288 The FCC and NTIA coordinate
their regulation through a Memorandum of Understanding.289
As the Ligado case well illustrates, the consequence of this bi-
furcation is that the FCC, using its own separate legislative man-
date, made an ultimate ruling on GPS use of radio spectrum by
its own standards, which were different from those advocated by
the executive branch agencies.
A. FCC REGULATION OF POSSIBLE GPS SIGNAL INTERFERENCE
BY LIGADO
For its administration of harmful interferences with radio fre-
quencies, the FCC adopted the ITU’s Radio Regulation 1.169,
which defines “harmful interference” as “[i]nterference which
endangers the functioning of radionavigation service or of other
safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly in-
terrupts a radiocommunication service operating in accordance
with [ITU] Radio Regulations.”290 GPS, by previous allocation of
284 Radio Frequency Spectrum is a Scarce, Natural Resource, FIN. EXPRESS (Feb. 12,
2003, 5:30 AM), https://www.financialexpress.com/archive/radio-frequency-
spectrum-is-a-scarce-natural-resource/64215/ [https://perma.cc/8KVU-5LTF].
285 See LightSquared, 35 FCC Rcd. at 3816.
286 Id. at 3773; see also What We Do, supra note 278.
287 LightSquared, 35 FCC Rcd. at 3821; About NTIA, supra note 82.
288 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303, 305, 902.
289 Press Release, Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, FCC and NTIA Sign New Memo-
randum of Understanding on Spectrum Coordination (Jan. 31, 2003), https://
www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-and-ntia-sign-new-memorandum-understanding-
spectrum-coordination [https://perma.cc/44Z4-WNXD].
290 ITU Radio Regulations, supra note 103, art. 1.169 (emphasis omitted).
36 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [86
frequencies, became free to use the 1559–1610 megahertz
(MHz) band for PNT signal services.291 Additionally, GPS receiv-
ers are also increasingly enabled to use the signal frequencies of
the three non-U.S. GNSS operators because interoperable re-
ceivers are built into many U.S. GNSS receivers.292
Various governmental, as well as nongovernmental, interests
opposed the assignment of frequencies to Ligado, alleging that
the requested frequencies were too close to and might weaken
the existing GPS signals and cause potential harmful interfer-
ence with GPS.293 DOD was most concerned because of the mili-
tary origin and management of GPS, as well as the extensive use
of GPS by military authorities.294
Previously, in 2012, United States government agencies had
urged the FCC to seek an appropriate balance between the po-
tential harmful interference caused by the applicant’s transmit-
ters and the GPS receivers.295 Achieving this balance became an
objective of the FCC. The FCC order in the Ligado case claimed
to have established this necessary balance.296 However, other
governmental departments do not agree and seek reversal of the
2020 ruling.297 They have subsequently requested the FCC to re-
consider its decision.298
The FCC rationalizes that its creation of a 23 MHz quiet band
will sufficiently isolate Ligado’s downlink at the 1526–1536
bandwidth from the GPS band at 1559–1610.299 Second, the
Ligado uplink bands at 1627.5–1637.5 and from 1646.5–1656.5
will similarly be sufficiently isolated from the GPS bandwidths by
a quiet guard band.300 The FCC therefore concluded that this
arrangement was in the public interest and should be permitted,
subject to a range of further conditions to ensure the elimina-
tion of several possibilities for harmful interference with previ-
ously allocated and assigned frequencies.301 The FCC decided
that the Ligado license thus constructed was a rational, efficient,
291 See LightSquared, 35 FCC Rcd. at 3773 n. 2.
292 Id. However, note that only Galileo has FCC authority to beam signals into
U.S. territory. See id.
293 Id. at 3805–06.
294 Id. at 3821.
295 Id. at 3777.
296 See id. at 3823.
297 See Datta, supra note 6.
298 Id.
299 See LightSquared, 35 FCC Rcd. at 3773.
300 Id. at 3788 n.95.
301 See id. at 3785–86.
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and economical use of the radio-frequency spectrum,302 and
that this ruling would advance the FCC’s goal of making addi-
tional spectrum accessible for Ligado to provide fast 5G level
services to a wide range of users.303
In its decision, the FCC declined to provide further protec-
tion for GPS receivers experiencing possible harmful interfer-
ence from transmissions coming from outside of the bandwidth
designated for GPS.304 The FCC suggested that GPS receivers
could be built so as not to experience problems with interfer-
ence, although some receivers may have to be retrofitted.305
The FCC found “little or no” harmful interference from
Ligado’s modified “base station or handset operations to the
hundreds of millions of” cell phones connected to GPS.306 The
FCC decision concluded that its order did “not cause harmful
interference” with “general location and navigation devices.”307
High-precision GPS receivers were examined, and the FCC con-
cluded that those kinds of receivers could be upgraded with bet-
ter antennas and thus made “immune” to interference.308
Importantly, the FCC declined to measure possible harmful
GPS signals interference by the measurement advocated by
DOD and DOT.309 The FCC stated that the metric measurement
would “examin[e] the GPS receivers to determine whether a re-
ceiver could experience a 1 dB degradation to the C/N[0] with
respect to any satellite within view of the receiver.”310 The FCC
reasoned that such measurement would not measure the actual
GPS receiver performance.311 Instead, the FCC decided to mea-
sure harmful interference by its own measurement methods
used in the allocation of spectrum to radio operators.312 Conse-
quently, the degree of GPS interference became evaluated as if
GPS were a radio operator rather than a PNT operator.313 DOT
and the FAA claimed and continue to argue that the FCC’s mea-
302 See id. at 3783, 3823; ITU Constitution, supra note 102, art. 44.
303 LightSquared, 35 FCC Rcd. at 3785; see infra Part V (discussion of 5G
technology).
304 LightSquared, 35 FCC Rcd. at 3806.
305 Id.
306 Id. at 3818.
307 Id.
308 Id.
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surement of actual performance failed to measure GPS’s PNT
performance, since the accuracy requirements of the two per-
formance measurements differ substantially.314
In its decision, the FCC referred to the ability of the Euro-
pean GNSS operator, Galileo, to operate in and send signals
into U.S. space, thus suggesting that Galileo is an alternate ser-
vice avenue for GNSS receivers in the United States.315 However,
reliance on a foreign GNSS at a roughly similar radio frequency
satisfies neither the United States’ governmental interest nor
the interests of nongovernmental operators. For example, DOD
would not be able to use Galileo for guidance of weaponry.
The FCC was particularly concerned about harmful interfer-
ence with military GPS.316 GPS is operated by the U.S. Air Force
and, thus, most of the objections to Ligado’s license were and
continue to be raised by Air Force.317 The FCC reasoned that
the Air Force objection to harmful interference caused by
Ligado relates to interference with high-precision GNSS receiv-
ers.318 The FCC concluded that its decision results in “a 99.3%
reduction” of the power level of Ligado operations.319 The order
states that the reduction will greatly reduce the possibility of
harmful interference with high-precision weaponry.320 The FCC
also states that its order will reduce the need to retrofit military
machinery.321 Further, the order required Ligado to cooperate
with the U.S. government to remove other possible interfer-
ences from Ligado’s ancillary terrestrial component stations.322
The FCC also ordered Ligado to exchange information with the
U.S. government about Ligado’s efforts to remove these con-
cerns.323 Furthermore, the FCC ordered the Air Force to inform
Ligado of specific GPS receivers that experience harmful inter-
ference in order for Ligado to resolve interference problems
with those receivers.324
314 See supra notes 309–13.
315 LightSquared, 35 FCC Rcd. at 3819.
316 See id. at 3823.
317 See Mountin, supra note 37, at 110 (“The U.S. Air Force’s GPS constellation
. . . provides the foundation for nearly all global commercial space-based naviga-
tion and timing.”).
318 LightSquared, 35 FCC Rcd. at 3821–23.
319 Id. at 3823.
320 Id. at 3823–24.
321 Id. at 3818.
322 Id. at 3824.
323 Id.
324 Id.
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The government departments had conducted several techni-
cal examinations and tests of possible Ligado harmful interfer-
ence with governmental operations of GPS signals—in
particular, DOD’s concern with interference with military weap-
onry and FAA’s concern with interference with navigation of
commercial airplanes and, consequently, with air traffic con-
trol.325 As a result, the NTIA expressed “significant concerns”
with the possible grant of radio frequencies to Ligado by the
FCC.326 DOD and FAA’s concerns were sufficiently serious for
the NTIA to state that the governmental agencies were “unable
to recommend” grant of license to Ligado.327 DOD stated that
grant of spectrum license to Ligado would have “a potential sig-
nificant negative impact on military operations.”328
The military concerns with the granting of Ligado’s license
have considerable momentum because of concerns with na-
tional defense. Those concerns are shared by congressional rep-
resentatives who support and approve the national defense
budget, and in particular the DOD GPS budget, which is mainly
funded because of its military functions.329
Nevertheless, the FCC was not persuaded by the governmen-
tal evidence presented by NTIA. The FCC resolved its difference
with the executive branch agencies by exercising its statutory
power to make its decision based on what it determines to be in
the public interest of the United States.330 Congressional mem-
bers’ interest in the Ligado decision is particularly important be-
cause Congress controls the budget of the executive branch
agencies and the FCC.331 Furthermore, Congress can overrule
the Ligado decision by adopting legislation contrary to it.
On April 22, 2020, the FCC issued its order authorizing
Ligado to use radio frequencies to provide service.332 On May
325 See id. at 3808, 3821.
326 Id. at 3832.
327 Id.
328 Id.
329 See generally KELLY M. SAYLER & JOHN R. HOEHN, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
IN11400, DOD CONCERNS ABOUT THE FCC-APPROVED LIGADO NETWORK (2020).
330 LightSquared, 35 FCC Rcd. at 3841–42. The FCC’s legal duty is to administer
U.S. spectrum, so as to “ensure that this valuable resource is used as efficiently as
possible without causing harmful interference to important applications, such as
GPS.” Id.
331 Power of the Purse, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES — U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
TIVES, https://history.house.gov/institution/origins-development/power-of-the-
purse/ [https://perma.cc/3V3R-9G89].
332 LightSquared, 35 FCC Rcd. at 3773.
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22, 2020, the NTIA, on behalf of DOD, DOT, and five other
executive branch agencies, asked the FCC to reconsider its or-
der and to postpone the effective date of the Ligado order until
the issue of harmful interference with GPS could be finally re-
solved.333 The petition was supported by a substantial part of the
aviation industry, including aircraft manufacturers.334 Further-
more, a thirty-two member bipartisan group of United States
senators joined to ask the FCC to reconsider.335 Members of the
House Armed Services Committee also supported the petition
to reconsider.336 The Air Line Pilots Association was particularly
concerned that uncertified private pilots and drone operators
using GPS receivers would collide with commercial airlines.337
The Assocation also expressed concern that airline passengers
could use cell phones to disrupt pilot contact with air traffic
control.338
B. DOD’S ADVERSARIAL ROLE AS THE GOVERNMENT OPERATOR
OF U.S. GPS
DOD operates and controls GPS.339 Virtually all military
equipment with computer features has some GPS connection.
An additional function of the Air Force is to track space objects
333 See Petition for Reconsideration or Clarification of the National Telecom-
munications and Information Administration at iii, 15, IB Docket Nos. 11-109, 12-
340 (filed May 22, 2020).
334 Letter of Support of NTIA Stay Petition, IB Docket Nos. 11-109, 12-340
(filed June 3, 2020).
335 David Shepardson, 32 U.S. Senators Urge FCC to Reconsider Ligado Spectrum
Order, REUTERS (May 15, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-telecom-
wireless/32-u-s-senators-urge-fcc-to-reconsider-ligado-spectrum-order-idUSKBN
22R2WQ [https://perma.cc/AQ7G-N9A8]. On August 13, 2020, the General Ac-
counting Office (GAO) ruled that the FCC had not violated 5 U.S.C.
§ 801(a)(1)(A)–(B), which requires the FCC to consult with Congress before is-
suing a ruling and before it can take effect. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., B-
332233, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION—APPLICABILITY OF THE CONGRES-
SIONAL REVIEW ACT TO LIGADO AMENDMENT TO LICENSE MODIFICATION APPLICA-
TIONS 1 (2020).
336 Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Armed Servs. Comm., Smith,
Thornberry, and 20 Bipartisan Members Demand Answers From FCC: Ligado
Spectrum Order Inconsistent with Federal Law (May 8, 2020), https://armedser
vices.house.gov/2020/5/smith-thornberry-and-20-bipartisan-members-demand-
answers-from-fcc [https://perma.cc/95FC-3SCJ].
337 Petition for Reconsideration of Air Line Pilots Association, International at
14, IB Docket Nos. 11-109, 12-340 (filed May 20, 2020).
338 Id. at 16.
339 Mountin, supra note 37, at 110.
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that may cause interference with military space objects, such as
GPS satellites.340
GPS offers two different kinds of services: (1) the Standard
Positioning Service (SPS), and (2) the Precise Positioning Ser-
vice (PPS).341 The SPS is not encrypted and, therefore, easy to
jam or spoof; it is generally available all over the world free of
charge.342 However, it is less precise than the PPS, which is en-
crypted and, therefore, is secure and less easy to jam or spoof.343
The PPS is dedicated to use by DOD and United States allies.344
Being heavily dependent on GPS, DOD is deeply concerned
with jamming, spoofing, and other harmful interference with
the GPS signal.345 Experience has proved that existing encryp-
tion alone is ultimately not sufficient to protect military sig-
nals.346 Therefore, the new military M-code is being developed
and installed.347 It will not only have a higher-powered GPS sig-
nal, but it will also be faster and more secure.348 The strength
and bandwidth needs are at issue in the Ligado case, which
seeks to avoid harmful interference by separating and isolating
the radio frequencies of competing parties.349 However, it will
still be possible (even likely) that some hacker will find a way to
interfere with GPS. Protection may only come with the develop-
ment of a radically different new technology.
C. DOD’S POTENTIAL FREEDOM FROM ITU SPECTRUM
MANAGEMENT
Article 48 of the ITU Constitution provides that national de-
fense services’ use of the radio-frequency spectrum remains free
340 See Paul B. Larsen, Space Traffic Management Standards, 83 J. AIR L. & COM.
359, 364–65 (2018).
341 Larsen, supra note 9, at 367.
342 Id. at 367, 412.
343 Id.
344 Id. at 367.
345 See supra Section II.A.1. There is an Army saying that “bits and bytes are as
dangerous as bullets and bombs.” Lee, supra note 2. Therefore, the military plans
to build—and is currently building—protective devices. See id.
346 Sally Cole, Securing Military GPS from Spoofing and Jamming Vulnerabilities,
MIL. EMBEDDED SYS. (Nov. 30, 2015), https://militaryembedded.com/comms/en-
cryption/securing-military-gps-spoofing-jamming-vulnerabilities [https://
perma.cc/HR4H-U67V].
347 See infra Section VIII.B (discussion of M-Code).
348 See id.
349 See In the Matter of LightSquared Tech. Working Grp. Report, 35 FCC Rcd.
3772, 3804–06 (2020).
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of ITU regulation.350 Nevertheless, the military installation may,
in general, cause harmful interference. Therefore, to avoid
harmful interference, the military services comply with ITU Ad-
ministrative Regulations regarding radio frequencies and gener-
ally with ITU regulatory provisions.351
Military stakes in outer space are escalating. The United States
has created a Space Force with a special military branch in order
to establish “American dominance in space.”352 The United
States now considers outer space to be a “warfighting domain in
and of itself.”353 Russia and China have also established special
military forces for outer space activities.354 Possible interference
with GNSS-equipped military weaponry and GNSS operation in
outer space is therefore a high priority.
The upshot is that the military authorities could use ITU Con-
stitution Article 48 to claim freedom from subjection to ITU ra-
dio frequency regulation. That would free GPS from ITU
bandwidth availability restrictions. However, military and civilian
activities increasingly intermingle so that it is difficult to distin-
guish military from civilian operations.355 However, operating
radio frequencies outside the ITU framework would also subject
military bandwidths to harmful interference by the nongovern-
mental users to whom ITU and FCC allocated radio frequencies.
The military authorities are therefore better served by subject-
ing themselves to, and participating in, the ITU radio frequen-
cies allocation.
D. EVALUATION OF FCC’S 2020 SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT
ORDER REGARDING POSSIBLE HARMFUL INTERFERENCE
WITH GPS FREQUENCIES BY LIGADO
The Ligado decision brings into question the FCC’s suitability
to decide the issue of harmful interference with the GPS signal
350 ITU Constitution, supra note 102, art. 48.
351 Id.; see also LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 195.
352 STEPHEN A. HILDRETH, JENNIFER K. ELSEA, LAWRENCE KAPP & KATHLEEN J.
MCINNIS, IF10950, CONG. RSCH. SERV., TOWARD THE CREATION OF A U.S. “SPACE
FORCE” 1 (2018).
353 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Department of Defense Establishes U.S.
Space Force (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Re
lease/Article/2045981/department-of-defense-establishes-us-space-force/ [https:
//perma.cc/ATE2-GDU7]; ITU Constitution, supra note 102, art. 48.
354 SECURE WORLD FOUND., supra note 193, at 1-22, 2-29; see generally PAVEL
PODVIG & HUI ZHANG, RUSSIAN AND CHINESE RESPONSES TO U.S. MILITARY PLANS IN
SPACE (2008).
355 Mountin, supra note 37, at 119.
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using radiocommunication standards.356 GPS is a new technol-
ogy, developed after the Communications Act was adopted in
1934.357 That legislation was intended to regulate radiocom-
munication issues.358 However, the harmful interference with
GPS raises issues that do not involve radiocommunication. The
FCC, operating with “archaic” legislation and regulation, was ar-
guably not qualified to decide the Ligado case. New federal law
needs to be enacted to protect GPS from radio interference.359
The current arrangement whereby NTIA and the FCC coordi-
nate spectrum assignment to government-operated GPS
presented a new issue that they could not resolve satisfacto-
rily.360 Their interrelationship needs to be streamlined. GPS
harmful interference issues need a more unified
decisionmaker.361
IV. ARGUMENT THAT CHINESE 5TH TECHNOLOGY
(5G) COULD INTERFERE WITH U.S. GPS SIGNALS
In 2019, 5G technology was introduced on mobile telephones
with internet access.362 5G technology establishes small digital
networks of cells that connect better and faster than 4G technol-
ogy.363 5G has its own independent network, which is used for
cell phone and computer internet access, and is much faster
than 4G technology.364 The troubling issue with 5G is whether
GPS signals may be subject to infiltration by Chinese advanced
5G technology when used for access to United States GPS.365
The 5G technology is particularly embedded in cell phone and
computer technology produced by the Chinese high-technology
356 Univ. of Neb., supra note 99.
357 Id.; The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–646.
358 See 47 U.S.C. § 151.
359 Univ. of Neb., supra note 99.
360 Id.
361 See id.
362 Todd Haselton, 5G Reality Check: You Won’t Need A 5G Phone Next Year, CNBC
(Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/04/5g-phones-are-coming-next-
year-heres-what-that-means-for-you.html [https://perma.cc/9VPH-PBJE].
363 Michael R. Bradley & Vincent Rotty, Fixing the Glitch: The Smart Rollout of 5G
Small Cell Wireless Networks Balancing Private and Public Interests, 63 S.D. L. REV. 483,
486–87 (2019).
364 Id. A late development is that civilian users will become able to authenticate
Galieo signals. Peter Gutierrez, Galileo to Transmit Open Service Authentication, IN-
SIDE GNSS (Feb. 3, 2020), https://insidegnss.com/brussels-view-galileo-to-trans
mit-open-service-authentication/ [https://perma.cc/ZS9D-3V6J].
365 See Larry W. Thorpe, The History & Future of 5G, 16 SCITECH LAW., Winter
2020, at 4, 8.
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company, Huawei.366 The United States fears that China may
program technology to report to Chinese intelligence authori-
ties because Chinese companies are subject to the Chinese gov-
ernment’s direction.367 This is particularly disturbing to United
States military authorities. The immediate issue centers on
whether Huawei should be permitted to market its 5G technol-
ogy in the United States and its allied countries, such as the
United Kingdom (UK).368 The United States government has
adopted a policy to exclude Huawei technology from entering
the country in order to protect GPS from potential Chinese
interference.369
The United States ban of Huawei causes political and techni-
cal difficulties for other states, which depend on its technol-
ogy.370 The UK has now joined the United States in banning
Huawei 5G technology and has told its telecommunications
companies to remove Huawei 5G technology from UK telecom-
munications networks.371 Other states concerned with Chinese
access to their military technology may also ban Huawei 5G tech-
nology.372 In addition to loss of foreign business, Huawei now
faces production difficulties because the United States recently
deprived the company from using semiconductor chips.373 The
company cannot build 5G technology without these chips.374
One consequence of banning Huawei may be a slower conver-
sion of United States technology to 5G.375
V. OTHER LIMITATIONS ON USE OF GNSS
A. PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESTRICTIONS
GNSS is used to track people through GNSS receivers in their
cell phones.376 GNSS users also attach tracking devices to cars
and even to children and people who have Alzheimer’s dis-
366 Id.
367 See Hadas Gold, UK Bans Huawei from Its 5G Network in Rapid About-Face,







373 Id. (“[N]ew sanctions . . . further reduced the company’s ability to manufac-
ture and maintain semiconductor chips using American-made technology.”).
374 Id.
375 Id.
376 See Larsen, supra note 9, at 388–89.
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ease.377 A great benefit is finding those who are lost or
stranded.378 Privacy laws govern the ability to track people
through GNSS.379 Tracking people may interfere with constitu-
tionally guaranteed basic liberty rights.380
The laws on information tracking differ among countries.381
Most countries have some interest in protecting privacy and
place restrictions on use of collected information.382 The EU is
particularly keen on protecting people’s privacy.383 Europe can
directly regulate the collection of data by its own GNSS,
Galileo.384 However, it is difficult for a European court to obtain
jurisdiction over U.S. GPS, Russian GLONASS, and Chinese
BeiDou, where sovereign immunity becomes an issue.385
A new GNSS privacy issue has arisen concerning the tracking
of people who have COVID-19 or who have recently had contact
with persons known to have the disease. Norway, for example,
used the “Smittestopp” computer application to trace people
suspected of carrying COVID-19 and then used GNSS to upload
such information without permission of the persons involved.386
That caused Amnesty International to complain to the Norwe-
gian Institute of Public Health and to Norway’s data protection
agency about invasion of privacy.387 Consequently, Norway
agreed to stop collecting this data.388 However, certain other
377 Id. at 389.
378 Id. GPS is also used to track animals. Id.
379 Id.; see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
891–908 (5th ed. 2015) (discussing constitutional protections for travel and con-
trol over information); U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
380 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
381 Larsen, supra note 9, at 389.
382 Id.
383 Commission Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 2016 O.J.
(L 119) 1, 3–4; Monika Zalnieriute, The Future of Data Retention Regimes and Na-
tional Security in the EU after the Quadrature Du Net and Privacy International Judg-
ment, 24 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS 1, 1–2 (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.asil.org/
sites/default/files/ASIL_Insights_2020_V24_I28.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VT7-
VS4B].
384 Larsen, supra note 9, at 369.
385 Id. at 389–90.
386 Norway: Halt to COVID-19 Contact Tracing App a Major Win for Privacy, AM-
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countries, such as South Korea, continue using GNSS to track
individuals affected by COVID-19.389
The main legal issue concerns the purpose for which the
tracking and tracing information is used. Does the collecting
state use the information to control COVID-19 or to control a
wider range of issues—for example, terrorism? Is it used to dis-
criminate between persons who have the disease and those who
do not have it? Is the tracking of people proportionate to the
danger of the disease? Does it comply with local privacy laws and
policies? Does it effectively reach its goal of controlling COVID-
19? On analysis, Norway found that the tracking was not effec-
tive.390 Use of GNSS to collect COVID-19 information may also
violate Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which provides everyone freedom from “arbitrary interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.”391 Article 13,
which guarantees everyone the right to freedom of movement,
also presents an issue.392
B. USE OF GNSS TO COLLECT EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES
GNSS is frequently used to track people in criminal cases. In
the case of United States v. Jones, the local police attached a GNSS
receiver to the suspect’s car in defiance of a geographically lim-
ited warrant.393 Without Jones’ consent, the GNSS receiver re-
mained attached to his car, tracking his movements for one
month.394 The prosecution used the evidence at his criminal
trial to prove the charge.395 On appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Court concluded that the privacy of the suspect had
been violated.396 The Court concluded that the evidence was
389 See Civ. GPS Serv. Interface Comm., China BeiDou Update, at 15:07, YOUTUBE
(Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P6s42dYHTBY&t=907s (last
visited June 2, 2021) (featuring Changjiang Geng, Test & Assessment Rsch. Ctr.,
China Satellite Navigation Off.); Agenda: 60th Meeting of the Civil GPS Service Inter-
face Committee, supra note 12.
390 Scott Ikeda, After Being Ranked Among the World’s Most Privacy-Invasive, Nor-




391 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. XII (Dec.
10, 1948).
392 Id. art. XIII.
393 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402–03 (2012).
394 Id. at 403.
395 Id.
396 Id. at 404, 413.
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collected in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution protecting “the right of the people to be secure in
their persons houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”397 The Court found that the attachment
of the GNSS device to the car and its use to monitor the move-
ments of the suspect constituted an illegal search, and the evi-
dence it provided must be excluded.398
VI. POSSIBLE REMEDIES FOR HARMFUL
INTERFERENCES WITH GNSS: WHITE HOUSE
EXECUTIVE ORDER 13905 STRENGTHENING NATIONAL
RESILIENCE THROUGH RESPONSIBLE USE OF
PNT SERVICES
A. THE ORDER
EO 13905, issued by President Trump on February 12, 2020,
recognizes that, despite precautions taken to protect GNSS from
harmful interferences, it remains vulnerable.399 The EO charac-
terizes the U.S. GPS as a basic utility like the electrical power
grid which supports life and which constitutes a “critical infra-
structure.”400 Consequently, EO 13905 expresses that:
It is the policy of the United States to ensure that disruption or
manipulation of PNT [GPS] services does not undermine the re-
liable and efficient functioning of its critical infrastructure. The
Federal Government must increase the Nation’s awareness of the
extent to which critical infrastructure depends on, or is en-
hanced by, PNT [GPS] services, and it must ensure critical infra-
structure can withstand disruption or manipulation of PNT
[GPS] services.401
This EO took several steps to protect GPS security and contin-
ued availability. The EO assigned DOC the major task of imple-
menting the new policy by developing GPS “standards,
guidelines, and sector-specific requirements” necessary to pro-
tect GPS and to prevent its disruption by harmful interfer-
ence.402 These standards, guidelines, and requirements are
397 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Jones, 565 U.S. at 405.
398 Jones, 565 U.S. at 405; see also Larsen, supra note 9, at 390.
399 Exec. Order No. 13905, 85 Fed. Reg. 9359, 9359 (Feb. 12, 2020).
400 Id.
401 Id. at 9359–60. GPS is known as the service for PNT. Id. at 9359. See also
Peter Behr & Christian Vasquez, Trump Orders ‘Overdue’ Grid, EV Defense, ENV’T &
ENERGY NEWS, https://www.eenews.net/stories/1062336293 [https://perma.cc/
48MF-WC9X].
402 Exec. Order No. 13905, 85 Fed. Reg. 9359, 9359 (Feb. 12, 2020).
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scheduled to be available one year after the EO’s issuance.403
DOC’s NIST must define PNT services and describe the possible
disruptive dangers facing these services.404 NIST will compile a
list of possible defenses that users may deploy to detect and
manage risks associated with GPS signal disruptions.405 NIST will
also develop and distribute a new global timing standard that
will measure time independently of GPS.406 This new time mea-
sure will be 1,000 times more accurate than current timing avail-
able on the Internet.407
An important provision of EO 13905 is that “[n]othing in this
order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect . . . the
authority granted by law to an executive department or agency,
or the head thereof.”408 The EO ordered several studies.409 How-
ever, it does not affect or change existing laws granting authority
or providing funding for DOD, DOT, DOC, or FCC.410
The EO asks DOD and other government departments to as-
sist the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
and the Secretary of Homeland Security with their assigned task
of ascertaining government agencies’ capability to apply DOC-
developed GPS “standards, guidelines, and sector-specific re-
quirements.”411 DOC’s contribution to the effort primarily in-
volves improved risk management by GNSS users stated in the
2020 Space Policy Directive 5, entitled Cybersecurity Principles
for Space Systems.412 The directive recommends GNSS users
adopt cybersecurity best practices, monitor and reduce risks in-
herent in their GNSS equipment, and estimate their jamming
403 Id. at 9360.
404 Id. at 9359–60; see also Strengthening National Resilience Through Responsible Use
of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Services – Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., https://www.nist.gov/pnt/faqs [https://perma.cc/
E827-NKNR].
405 Strengthening National Resilience Through Responsible Use of Positioning, Naviga-
tion, and Timing Services – Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 404.
406 Responsible Use of Positioning, Navigation and Timing Services, NAT’L INST. OF
STANDARDS & TECH., https://www.nist.gov/pnt [https://perma.cc/H7XQ-CJ8P].
407 Id.; Exec. Order No. 13905, 85 Fed. Reg. at 9360.
408 Exec. Order No. 13905, 85 Fed. Reg. at 9360.
409 Id. at 9359–60; Memorandum on Space Policy Directive-7, supra note 45.
410 See Exec. Order No. 13905, 85 Fed. Reg. at 9360; Memorandum on Space
Policy Directive-7, supra note 45.
411 Exec. Order No. 13905, 85 Fed. Reg. at 9360.
412 Memorandum on Space Policy Directive-5, Cybersecurity Principles for
Space Systems, 85 Fed. Reg. 56155, 56156–57 (Sept. 9, 2020).
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and spoofing risk tolerance as well as their ability to recover af-
ter disruptions.413
B. EVALUATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13905
GPS is in deep trouble. Harmful interference with GPS signals
threatens basic safety and security of the GPS users.414 The gov-
ernment needed to deal with this harmful interference, and the
EO, as well as associated presidential directives on the subject,
reflect the serious need for this attention.415 EO 13905 assigned
major responsibility for its execution to DOC, which has an eco-
nomic laissez-faire attitude towards GPS safety, in contrast to
FAA’s safety mission, which currently maintains safety oversight
of GPS for airplane navigation.416 In the past, the joint military
and civil PNT Committee, established by the 2004 U.S. Space-
Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing National Security
Presidential Directive (NSPD-39), has had interagency oversight
responsibility for GPS.417 The PNT Committee coordinates GPS
activities among the government agencies and issues national
guidance.418 Co-chaired by DOD and DOT, it coordinates spec-
trum management among the government departments.419
Members also include the Departments of State, Commerce,
Homeland Security, Interior, Agriculture, as well as the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and NASA.420 The PNT Committee, which has a
permanent staff, has several subcommittees and working groups
on specific GPS issues.421 The PNT Committee meets regularly
and provides national and international guidance.422 DOD’s
membership in the PNT Committee establishes important pol-
icy and operative cooperation between the military GPS pro-
413 Id.; see Agenda: 60th Meeting of the Civil GPS Service Interface Committee, supra
note 12; Civ. GPS Serv. Interface Comm., DHS PNT Update, supra note 12; Civ.
GPS Serv. Interface Comm., Resilient PNT System Concepts for Critical Infrastructure,
supra note 12.
414 See Larsen, supra note 9, at 392.
415 Exec. Order No. 13905, 85 Fed. Reg. 9359; Memorandum on Space Policy
Directive-5, Cybersecurity Principles for Space Systems, 85 Fed. Reg. 56155; Mem-
orandum on Space Policy Directive-7, supra note 45.
416 Exec. Order No. 13905, 85 Fed. Reg. at 9360; Larsen, supra note 51, at 462.
417 National Security Presidential Directive-39, U.S. Space-Based Position, Navi-
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vider and other government users.423 The Civil GPS Service
Interface Committee provides important coordination with non-
governmental users.424 The EO does not change NSPD-39, nor
does it mention the PNT Committee established by that presi-
dential directive.425 The EO review of GPS barely mentions
DOD, DOT, or FAA.426 Because interference with GPS signals
mostly affects safety,427 the following observations are made
about the effect of the EO.
GPS is a military service located in and administered by DOD
on a particular legal mandate from Congress and funded by
Congress.428 Thus, DOD is the key agency. GPS is a basic ingre-
dient of the military structure.429 Other agencies are basically in
the position of making recommendations.430 DOD has been will-
ing to make GNSS available for civilian uses.431
GPS is a GNSS just like the other three services (GLONASS,
BeiDou, and Galileo).432 GPS was the first GNSS and remains
the most popular one around the world.433 GPS is part of other
countries’ national infrastructures just as it is part of the U.S.
infrastructure.434 The issue of dependability and possible harm-
ful interference with its signals is as much an international prob-
lem as it is a national one.435 The international issues are
discussed more extensively elsewhere in this Article.436
Jamming, spoofing, and other harmful spectrum interference
disruptions are basic safety problems that can result in collisions
and loss of human life.437 Harmful interference with air naviga-
tion can result in accidents involving loss of cargo and hundreds
423 Id.
424 Civil GPS Service Interface Committee, supra note 146.
425 See Exec. Order No. 13905, 85 Fed. Reg. 9359, 9360 (Feb. 12, 2020).
426 See id. DOD and FAA were the moving government parties in the FCC
Ligado proceeding. In the Matter of LightSquared Tech. Working Grp. Report,
35 FCC Rcd. 3772, 3776 n.18, 3783 (2020).
427 Lee, supra note 2.
428 DOD administers GPS pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 2281. See Larsen, supra note
51, at 459, 461–62.
429 Larsen, supra note 51, at 462.
430 Id.
431 Id. at 460.
432 Larsen, supra note 9, at 366–70.
433 Id. at 366.
434 Id. at 367–68.
435 See id. at 382.
436 See discussion supra Section II.B.
437 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 352–53.
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of passengers.438 DOC’s suggestion to analyze the economic
risks involved in outer space activities will probably fail to resolve
these basic safety problems effectively.439
The basic safety problems caused by the harmful interference
with GPS signals described in this Article440 can best be ex-
amined and prevented by an agency that is basically concerned
with safety. The PNT Committee, FAA, and DOD should there-
fore continue overseeing basic safety of civilian GPS.
VII. NEW TECHNOLOGY TO PERFORM THE TASKS
PRESENTLY DONE BY GPS
A. STRENGTHENING EXISTING GPS TECHNOLOGY
Military authorities are developing a new generation of GPS-
III satellites to remedy some existing GPS system weaknesses.441
The new technology will digitalize and fully encrypt signals with
anti-jamming and anti-spoofing features.442 The satellites will
“have three times greater accuracy and eight times improved
anti-jamming capability.”443 The military authorities have con-
tracted for even more sophisticated technology, including a
“fully digital navigation payload [and] something called a re-
gional military protection which is a new, more powerful re-
gional signal for our warfighters that will help give an increased
anti-jam and anti-spoofing capability.”444 Furthermore, it will
have a “laser retroreflector array,” enabling users to send a laser
to the satellite for more accurate information.445 Despite these
technological advances, others remain focused on developing
even more sophisticated jamming devices to overcome anti-jam-
ming efforts.446
438 Id.
439 See GPS Economic Study, OFF. OF SPACE COM. (Aug. 9, 2019), https://
www.space.commerce.gov/gps-economic-study-presentation/ [https://perma.
cc/E7KN-46ZY].
440 See supra Part III.
441 Tadjdeh, supra note 63.
442 Id.
443 Id.
444 Id. (quoting Jonathan Caldwell, Vice President for Navigation Sys., Lock-
heed Martin).
445 Id.
446 See Daniele Borio & Pau Closas, A Fresh Look at GNSS Anti-Jamming, INSIDE
GNSS, Sept./Oct. 2017, at 54, 54–55, https://insidegnss.com/auto/sepoct17-
BORIO_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3N8Q-CPWG].
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B. THE NEW GPS MILITARY M-CODE ENCRYPTION
The difference between civilian and military GPS continues to
grow. The military specially developed M-code to protect mili-
tary uses from jamming, spoofing, and other harmful interfer-
ences with the GPS signals.447 The M-code is further encrypted
and protected and thus even more different from the unpro-
tected standard signals available to the civilians.448 The M-code,
when fully deployed, will enable the military GPS to become an
autonomous system, meaning receivers will be able to acquire
the M-code signal without access to other signals.449 The M-code
is transmitted on the existing GPS radio frequencies.450 It uses a
special “high-gain directional antenna” in addition to the ex-
isting antenna.451 The signal is sent by the directional antenna
functioning like a “spot beam” aimed at a specific destination.452
Thus, the signal is 100 times stronger than existing GPS sig-
nals.453 The extra strength will make the signals more difficult to
jam, spoof, or otherwise be subject to interference.454
The M-code is being built into a dozen advanced GPS-III satel-
lites and will gradually take the place of the previously encrypted
military satellites.455 Eventually, DOD will have only one uniform
system for its use.456 All equipment will be aligned with the M-
code, and will thus be better protected.457 The military services
will be able to operate totally independently of the standard
GPS while still using the same frequencies but without interfer-
ing with the standard GPS.458
447 Jan Van Sickle, The M-Code, PA. STATE UNIV., https://www.e-education.
psu.edu/geog862/node/1862 [https://perma.cc/DZ6P-6JT2].
448 Brian Barker, John W. Betz, John E. Clark, Jeffrey T. Correia, James T. Gil-
lis, Steven Lazar, Kaysi A. Rehborn & John R. Straton, Overview of the GPS M Code
Signal, in PROC. OF THE 2000 NAT’L TECH. MEETING OF THE INST. OF NAVIGATION
542, 543 (2000).
449 Id. at 545–46.
450 Id. at 546.
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As became apparent in the Ligado proceeding,459 changes in
existing military equipment will increase M-code compatibility.
The M-code requires an expensive transition to new technology,
which will take some years.460 Overlap with older GPS codes will
remain for some time, until all military devices gradually convert
to M-code.461 All new GPS signal equipment will be built to in-
corporate the M-code.462 The change to full compatibility with
the M-code is expensive, and Congress must budget for the addi-
tional cost.463 Thus, the President must ask Congress for in-
creases in the military budget.464 For the 2020 military budget,
President Trump asked Congress for an additional $330 million
for M-code conversion, and DOD will likely need an additional
$1.76 billion to convert all military equipment.465
M-code development shows how military GPS is becoming in-
creasingly separated from civilian GPS.466 The military authori-
ties wish to become unburdened of responsibility for civilian
GPS.467 However, civilian GPS use far exceeds total military
use.468 Separating civilian and military GPS would require Con-
gress to appropriate billions of dollars for an independent civil-
ian GPS system.469 That seems unlikely.
C. ENCRYPTION OF CIVILIAN GNSS SIGNALS
Civilian standard GNSS signal encryption might require each
person who wants to use GNSS to enter into an agreement.470
That would place the service on an entirely different legal basis
because the GNSS provider would be subject to the agreement’s
terms.471 Furthermore, the existing ease of use would be gone:
each user would have an individual relationship with the pro-
vider.472 GNSS would no longer be free like the air or open
https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2020/11/24/allies-begin-or
dering-m-code-enabled-gps-receivers/ [https://perma.cc/X8HF-U7T9].
459 See supra Section IV.A.






466 Larsen, supra note 9, at 412.
467 Id. at 411.
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470 Milner, supra note 6.
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roads.473 It would also change the relationship between GPS and
its users. Civilian users would have to be screened for dependa-
bility and trustworthiness before being told the secret GPS en-
cryption, and a special government bureaucracy would likely be
created to administer permit issuance. That would probably re-
sult in charging money to use GPS navigation services, perhaps
similar to how Canada now charges airlines for use of Canadian
air traffic control.474
How would a change from free GPS to one that the user pays
for affect GPS PNT? Such a change would probably also affect
the other three GNSS (GLONASS, Galileo, and BeiDou) that
now provide free global GNSS services.475 If they continue to
provide free services, global use of civilian GPS would probably
cease. Other GNSS services would also likely shift to a system of
encryption and charges.
Administration would be expensive and would create an addi-
tional, probably unwanted burden for DOD. Also, the process of
permitting and charging would involve a different legal relation-
ship between governmental GPS and its users because the users
might hold GPS responsible for service quality.476
VIII. ALTERNATIVE GNSS TECHNOLOGIES
Jamming, spoofing, and other interference has motivated in-
terest in PNT technology other than GPS.477 Three alternative
services are in development. One is a terrestrial system.478 The
other two are satellite systems in LEO instead of in medium-
Earth orbit (MEO) like the four current GNSS.479 Ideally, the
alternative technologies would be speedier and send stronger
473 Larsen, supra note 9, at 385.
474 Scott McCartney, The Air-Traffic System U.S. Airlines Wish They Had, WALL ST.
J. (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-air-traffic-system-u-s-airlines-
wish-they-had-1461776053 [https://perma.cc/A49M-WCY4].
475 Larsen, supra note 9, at 385.
476 See id.
477 Michelle V. Rafter, U.S. Transportation Officials Seek Alternative Tech for GPS,
IEEE SPECTRUM (Apr. 24, 2020), https://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/satel
lites/us-transportation-officials-seek-alternative-tech-for-gps [https://perma.cc/
XA5C-4V5C].
478 Jeff Shepard, eLoran A Terrestrial Alternative to GPS, MICROCONTROLLER TIPS
(Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.microcontrollertips.com/eloran-a-terrestrial-alterna
tive-to-gps/ [https://perma.cc/Z7EM-7DM3].
479 Nathan Strout, COVID, OneWeb And How The Space Development Agency Has
Coped, C4ISRNET (May 26, 2020), https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/
space/2020/05/26/covid-oneweb-and-how-the-space-development-agency-has-
coped/ [https://perma.cc/7MLF-XBAG].
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signals that would be more difficult to jam, spoof, or otherwise
be interfered with.480
A. ELORAN: TERRESTRIAL SUBSTITUTE FOR OUTER SPACE GNSS
The question of alternative GNSS technology initially focused
on pre-GPS navigation technology, the Loran-C navigation sys-
tem.481 After the change to GPS, countries began to do away
with the Loran-C system.482 However, jamming, spoofing, and
other interference problems provoked interest in advanced Lo-
ran-C, called eLoran,483 which is difficult to jam or spoof be-
cause of the huge, easily-detectable antennas required.484
eLoran would be a standardized, international PNT service.485 It
would meet performance requirements for aviation, shipping,
and automobiles.486 eLoran would build on old Loran-C facili-
ties.487 Other countries have also expressed interest in this alter-
native to GPS.488 The U.S. National Timing, Resilience, and
Security Act authorized DOT to develop a terrestrial substitute
for GNSS.489 DOT is ready to submit the results of its study to
Congress.490 EO 13905 includes development of national PNT
“that are not dependent on global navigation satellite sys-
480 Rafter, supra note 477.
481 See Larsen, supra note 9, at 383–84.
482 Id.
483 Id.
484 Georg T. Becker, Sherman Lo, David De Lorenzo, Di Qiu, Christof Paar &
Per Enge, Efficient Authentication Mechanisms for Navigation Systems – A Radio-Navi-
gation Case Study, in PROC. OF THE 22ND INT’L TECH. MEETING OF THE SATELLITE
DIV. OF THE INST. OF NAVIGATION 901, 902 (2009).
485 Arthur Helwig, Gerard Offermans, Chris Stout & Charles Schue, eLoran Sys-
tem Definition and Signal Specification Tutorial, in 40TH INT’L LORAN ASS’N ANN.
CONVENTION & TECH. SYMP. (Nov. 18, 2011), https://www.loran.org/proceedings
/Meeting2011/ILA%202011%20Tutorial.pdf [https://perma.cc/CAS5-RFLE].
486 Id.
487 House Committee Moves to Block Loran-C Teardowns, INSIDE GNSS (Feb. 14,
2014), https://insidegnss.com/house-committee-moves-to-block-loran-c-tear-
downs/ [https://perma.cc/VQ4C-9KC8].
488 Larsen, supra note 9, at 384.
489 49 U.S.C. § 312(a).
490 Datta, supra note 6; see generally Agenda: 60th Meeting of the Civil GPS Service
Interface Committee, supra note 12; Civ. GPS Serv. Interface Comm., DOT PNT Up-
date, at 43:40, YOUTUBE (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=6FpKN018zSM&t=2620s (last visited June 2, 2021) (featuring Andrew
Hansen, Volpe Nat’l Transp. Sys. Ctr. & Karen Van Dyke, PNT & Spectrum Man-
ager, U.S. Dep’t of Transp.).
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tems.”491 However, other countries, such as the UK, have since
decided against a terrestrial substitute for GNSS.492
B. DOD’S SDA CONTRACT FOR A MILITARY ALTERNATIVE TO
GPS
In 2019, DOD’s new Space Development Agency (SDA) be-
gan plans for a military alternative to GPS, to be ready by 2023,
which would replace GPS if the M-code encryption and other
precautionary changes fail to protect the military GPS from dis-
ruptive interference.493 Toward that purpose, DOD contracted
with two companies, Lockheed Martin and York Space Systems,
to each build ten small satellites (twenty total) for delivery in
2022.494 These satellites will be placed in LEO and will be the
first step towards placing a constellation of several hundred
small satellites in LEO.495 This new satellite system will provide
navigation for and communication with military equipment if
the GPS system is compromised.496 DOD plans to deploy 100
small satellites by 2024, which will be sufficient to allow use of
the system as planned.497 The new satellite system will enable
DOD to control and direct military equipment on the surface
more effectively than with GPS.498 Besides the existing PNT sig-
nals, the new satellite network will have additional PNT capabil-
491 Exec. Order No. 13905, 85 Fed. Reg. 9359, 9360 (Feb. 12, 2020); see also
Memorandum on Space Policy Directive-7, supra note 45.
492 Reuters, Europe Gives Up on eLoran, MARITIME EXEC. (Feb. 9, 2016, 7:23 AM),
https://maritime-executive.com/article/europe-gives-up-on-eloran [https://
perma.cc/6XRY-896R].
493 Sandra Erwin, Lockheed Martin, York Space to Produce 20 Satellites for Space De-
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ity.499 The SDA Director announced: “We’re not going to
broadcast like GPS does, but folks that are on our
comm[unication] channel can get navigation using our
backbone.”500
The military alternative would serve a wider purpose than
GPS. Whether it could be considered a weapon of mass destruc-
tion in violation of OST Article IV would depend on its wider
uses.501 The military could fall back on the new satellite network
in case GPS is compromised. The SDA and the new satellite net-
work will be transferred to the newly established U.S. Space
Force in 2022.502
C. ONEWEB AS ALTERNATIVE GNSS
The UK has bought control of OneWeb Satellites
(OneWeb).503 The UK will turn the company into an alternative
global PNT service.504 The objective is similar to DOD’s plan to
place a new PNT system in LEO, except that it will service both
civilian and military customers.505 OneWeb is a small satellite
company which has already placed seventy-four small satellites
in LEO and has existing authority and plans to place a satellite
constellation of 648 satellites in LEO.506 The use of LEO and of
the Ku-band of radio frequencies—rather than the L-band used
by GPS—will make OneWeb’s signals stronger and harder to
jam, spoof, or otherwise be interfered with.507 OneWeb has re-
quested further authority to place 48,000 small satellites in
499 Kimberly Underwood, Military Aims to Urgently Provide Disruptive Satellite Ca-
pability, AFCEA INT’L (Aug. 1, 2020), https://www.afcea.org/content/military-
aims-urgently-provide-disruptive-satellite-capabilities [https://perma.cc/2E7G-
C84U].
500 Id. (quoting Derek Tournear, Director, Nat’l Space Dev. Agency).
501 Bruno Hasselmann, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Article IV Outer Space Treaty
and the Relation to General Disarmament, reprinted in PROC. TWENTY-FIFTH COLLOQ.
L. OF OUTER SPACE 99, 108 (1982); see also LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 449.
502 Valerie Insinna, Space Development Agency on Track to Become Part of Space Force
in 2022, Director Says, DEF. NEWS (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.defensenews.com/
space/2020/01/21/space-development-agency-on-track-to-become-part-of-space-
force-in-2022-director-says/ [https://perma.cc/WSX5-DC2L].
503 Tony Osborne, OneWeb Buy Could Pave Way to UK Sovereign GNSS, 182 AVIA-




507 Id.; see also Steve Nichols, L/Ku/Ka-Band Satellites – What Does It All Mean?,
GET CONNECTED (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.getconnected.aero/2017/09/
lkuka-band-satellites-mean/#:~:text=the%20terms%20L%2Dband%2C%20Ku,
are%20bandied%20around%20quite%20freely.&text=L%2Dband%20uses
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LEO.508 “OneWeb will offer something new into the [PNT]
arena, and not simply another alternative system.”509 OneWeb
will also provide access to “broadspeed-band internet . . . with-
out the additional cost of ground infrastructure.”510 The new
service will serve civilians but will also be linked to and used by
UK military services.511 However, OneWeb’s different satellite
technology would require different receivers than currently
used for GNSS.512
D. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES
The eLoran terrestrial navigation system would bring the
satellites much closer to the users, which would increase the
speed of the service and considerably strengthen the signal.513
DOD’s SDA contract for a GPS alternative in LEO is intended
for military use.514 It does not help nongovernmental users who
are left with the existing, increasingly dangerous PNT system.
OneWeb, the other LEO satellite service, has yet to develop into
a PNT system that could be considered seriously.515 It may be-
come relevant if it remains a U.S. system, but if it becomes a UK
system, then it is less likely to replace GPS. As a foreign service,
it would need FCC permission to beam signals into the United
States.516 Consequently, OneWeb’s ability to take the place of
the current GNSS networks is questionable.
IX. SOLUTIONS AND OPTIONS
Jamming, spoofing, and other harmful interferences have ex-
posed a basic fault in GNSS. A fundamental weakness has devel-
oped. Silence is consent to the weakened system. Unless and
until the structure is repaired and fortified, the weakness will
grow until the system collapses.
%20frequencies%20in,segment%20of%20the%20electromagnetic%20spectrum
[https://perma.cc/7MNS-3EAL].
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perma.cc/SJ4N-GHQX].
513 Becker et al., supra note 484, at 902.
514 Erwin, supra note 493.
515 Strout, supra note 479.
516 See In the Matter of LightSquared Tech. Working Grp. Report, 35 FCC Rcd.
3772, 3773 n.2 (2020).
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A. SOLUTIONS
1. Ultimate Viability of GNSS?
The first question is whether the existing highly vulnerable
GNSS in MEO are dependable and ultimately viable. The ex-
isting GNSS have been jammed, spoofed, and interfered with.517
Encrypted GNSS signals are more secure than unencrypted sig-
nals, but all are vulnerable. Failure to remedy the problem
could result in loss of confidence in the crucial GNSS infrastruc-
ture.518 What is required to establish a GNSS sufficiently resilient
to withstand harmful interference? One solution might be to re-
build all GNSS receivers to filter out harmful interferences, like
those caused by Ligado. Another option is to greatly increase
GNSS signal strength, making it more difficult for the signals to
be overpowered by stronger signals.519 However, such changes
could involve huge cost. This solution might also require larger
constellations, with hundreds of LEO satellites per system, in-
stead of the 24–30 MEO satellites required by the existing
GNSS.520 As an interim solution, Congress is considering legisla-
tion prohibiting DOD compliance with the FCC Ligado order
until a satisfactory solution has been negotiated.521
2. Harmful Interference is an International Problem
Can one country, even a leading space power like the United
States, resolve the international problem of GNSS jamming and
spoofing, much of which is caused beyond national borders?
Each GNSS is separately operated and controlled by the Euro-
pean Space Agency, as well as U.S., Russian, and Chinese mili-
tary authorities.522 All the GNSS are interoperable.523 They serve
as back-ups for one other in case an existing system fails. Each
operator can and does encrypt and modify parts of their system
to avoid harmful interferences, but all the systems are vulnera-
ble.524 Nevertheless, all the systems are global, so any changes
affect the entire world. The U.S. GPS system is even more glob-
517 Larsen, supra note 9, at 382.
518 Id. at 383.
519 Osborne, supra note 503, at 70.
520 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 340; Milner, supra note 6.
521 Dawn M.K. Zoldi, Ligado Soars Over Another Obstacle to 5G Domination, INSIDE
GNSS (Sept. 23, 2020), https://insidegnss.com/ligado-soars-over-another-obsta
cle-to-5g-domination/ [https://perma.cc/X66H-JFFN].
522 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 465.
523 Id. at 348.
524 Id.
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ally ingrained into existing ways of living and operating than the
other systems, and in that sense, it is the most dependent on
reliable GNSS.525 But all countries are vulnerable when GNSS is
attacked. Therefore, there is a prevailing international interest
in and need for secure GNSS. Harmful interference is an inter-
national problem in need of international solution.
3. Effect of Military Encrypted M-code that Excludes Civilians
Suppose the military authorities abandon GPS in favor of the
special M-code PNT system in LEO. If not the military, which
agency would operate nongovernmental GNSS and protect it
from harmful interference? The M-code’s extensive military
GNSS signals encryption may satisfy military authorities’ imme-
diate need to avoid harmful interference with GNSS signals, but
that presents a dilemma for the nongovernmental users.526 Pro-
viding protection against harmful interference is outside the in-
herent functions of the military.527 M-code moves military users
further from responsibility for nongovernmental users and their
unencrypted standard signals.528 It increases the likelihood of
separation of nongovernmental from governmental GNSS.529 It
leaves unencrypted nongovernmental GNSS in an increasingly
dangerous situation.
4. Need for a U.S. Government GPS Decision Maker
A nonmilitary decision maker like the FCC is probably not
qualified to decide whether the military GPS is adequately pro-
tected from radio interference from other users of radio fre-
quencies. The Ligado case illustrates how differences on
spectrum policy can endanger services.530 The United States is
not well served by having GPS spectrum policy decided by a gov-
ernment agency that is not part of the executive branch.531 Bet-
ter government policy coordination is needed.532 Congress
525 Id. at 341.
526 Tadjdeh, supra note 63.
527 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 475.
528 Larsen, supra note 9, at 412.
529 Id.
530 See also Jeff Foust, GPS Committee Calls FCC Ligado Order a “Grave Error”,
SPACENEWS (July 1, 2020), https://spacenews.com/gps-committee-calls-fcc-ligado
-order-a-grave-error/ [https://perma.cc/6UVX-HPRN].
531 Id.
532 Theresa Hitchens, Iridium Publicly Threatens Lawsuit to Overturn FCC’s Ligado
Vote, BREAKING DEF. (July 10, 2020), https://breakingdefense.com/2020/07/irid-
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needs to give the executive branch authority for unitary deci-
sion-making on GPS spectrum assignment.533
5. Which U.S. Government Agency Could Best Supervise Civilian
GPS?
GNSS is indispensable for traffic safety both on Earth and in
space. Civilian GNSS is increasingly subject to harmful interfer-
ence.534 However, the White House 2020 GPS policy decision to
assign GPS oversight responsibility to the DOC created a new
problem.535 GNSS is basically a technological safety tool—it per-
forms basic PNT functions.536 It has become a pillar of the na-
tional infrastructure.537 The White House’s decision, via EO
13905, to treat GPS as an economic issue by assigning policy
leadership to the DOC does not suit civilian GPS technological
and safety policy requirements.538 DOT has a practical technical
stake in GPS technology.539 NSPD-39 placed civilian GPS in
DOT/FAA, where it should remain.540
B. OPTIONS
An option that would provide quick GNSS reinforcement
across the board is badly needed, but does not exist. Combining
military and civilian GNSS complicates the search for and
achievement of a 100% solution. A recent study shows that the
space powers have invested heavily in offensive cyber technology
capable of interfering with communication networks.541 The
United States outspends the other space powers, indicating that
the United States would have difficulty in giving up cyber tech-
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The Economist reports that the United States invested $17 billion in offensive cyber
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lowing scale of possible options and solutions begins with the
easiest but also weakest solution. It ends with the most difficult,
but also the strongest solution.
1. Voluntary International Harmful Interference Guidelines
The easiest option may be to use the U.N. Space Debris
Guidelines as a model for resolving the GNSS problem with
harmful interferences with civilian GNSS. In 2007, COPUOS
adopted space debris guidelines which were approved by the
U.N. General Assembly in 2008.543 While the space debris guide-
lines are voluntary, the individual states are asked to adopt them
as mandatory regulations.544 Many states, including the United
States, have done so.545 The adoptions have not been uniform,
and COPUOS guidelines on harmful interference with GNSS
would at least establish an international baseline or standard for
national regulation.546
GNSS harmful interference guidelines, similar in form, that
might apply to GNSS would include the following elements:
(1) Apply the COPUOS interference guidelines only to jam-
ming, spoofing, and harmful interference with civilian
GNSS;547
543 U.N. Off. for Outer Space Affs., Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, U.N.
Doc. V.09–88517 (Jan. 2010); G.A. Res. 62/217, International Cooperation in the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Dec. 22, 2007).
544 G.A. Res. 62/217, supra note 543, ¶ 27; Ram S. Jakhu & Md Tanveer
Ahmad, The Outer Space Treaty and States’ Obligation to Remove Space Debris: A US
Perspective, SPACE REV. (Nov. 13, 2017), https://thespacereview.com/article/
3370/1 [https://perma.cc/33HP-QQCE].
545 Jakhu & Ahmad, supra note 544; Kevin Conole, Head of Delegation, U.S.
Statement at 2020 COPUOS Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (Feb. 5,
2020), https://vienna.usmission.gov/2020-copuos-stsc-u-s-on-space-debris/
[https://perma.cc/H7MZ-CB3U].
546 The ICG agenda already includes the issues of spectrum interference. LY-
ALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 356–58 (discussing the ICG). The ICG has
adopted recommendation for interference and spectrum protection. See also GPS
Serv. Interface Comm., U.S. National Space-Based PNT Update, YOUTUBE, at 52:05,
(Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rr11pyY79-M&t=3125s (last
visited June 2, 2021) (featuring Harold Martin, Director, Dir. Nat’l Off. for Space-
Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing); Civ. GPS Serv. Interface Comm.,
GPS User Perspectives, YOUTUBE, at 1:14:01, (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=Rr11pyY79-M&t=4441s (last visited June 2, 2021) (featuring
Adm. Thad Allen, U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.), U.S. PNT Advisory Bd. Chair); G.A.
Res. 59/2, Review of the Implementation of the Recommendations of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (Oct. 20, 2004).
547 See generally G.A. Res. 62/217, supra note 543.
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(2) Recognize the OST Article IX obligation to engage in co-
operation and mutual assistance so as to avoid harmful
interferences with civilian GNSS;548
(3) Express recognition of state sovereignty;
(4) Acknowledge that GNSS is a necessary tool for Earth
infrastructure;549
(5) Recognize the mutual benefits of preserving civilian
GNSS without jamming, spoofing, or other harmful
interference;550
(6) Declare the urgency of eliminating all civilian GNSS jam-
ming, spoofing, and harmful interference;551 and
(7) Place the burden on each state to prohibit governmental
and nongovernmental jamming, spoofing, and other ra-
dio interferences with civilian GNSS uses.
COPUOS guidelines on harmful interference with civilian GNSS
radionavigation frequencies would recommend that states make
the guidelines subject to mandatory application and enforce-
ment. That could become the first step towards international
prohibition on harmful interference.
The existing COPUOS ICG would be the logical group to pre-
pare U.N. guidelines on GNSS harmful interference.552 Action
by COPUOS should be expedited if this option is accepted. This
option’s weakness is the lack of uniformity, universal adoption,
and enforcement.
2. Changing the FCC Definition of Harmful Interference
The Ligado decision brought into question the FCC’s compe-
tency to decide the harmful GPS signal interference issue using
radiocommunication standards.553 GPS technology is new and
outside the scope of the Communications Act, which Congress
intended to regulate radiocommunication issues.554 New federal
law, or at the very least new FCC definition of harmful interfer-
ence, should be enacted to protect GPS from radio interference.
548 OST, supra note 62, art. IX.
549 Larsen, supra note 9, at 365.
550 Id. at 392–93.
551 Id. at 382–83.
552 International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems, U.N. OFF. FOR
OUTER SPACE AFFS., https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/icg/icg.html
[https://perma.cc/64JT-TYDK].
553 Foust, supra note 530.
554 Univ. of Neb., supra note 99; 47 U.S.C. § 151.
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3. A Unified U.S. Government Decision Maker
The current NTIA and FCC coordination of GPS spectrum
allocation should be streamlined. A more unified decision-
maker for harmful interference issues needs to be established.
The United States scatters decision-making regarding GPS
harmful interference among too many agencies.555 The harmful
interference issue involves all the government members of the
interagency PNT Committee.556 EO 13905 could result in even
greater dilution of decision-making authority.557 A more unified
government decision structure for administration and policy
formation would establish greater confidence in GPS.558
4. Encrypting All Civilian GNSS Signals
Encryption of the civilian standard GNSS signals is looming. It
may require each service to enter into an arrangement with indi-
vidual GNSS service users.559 That would place GNSS service on
a different legal basis because the GNSS service provider would
be subject to the arrangement’s terms.560 The existing ease of
use would be replaced by a more complex strategy. Each user
would have an individual relationship with the provider.561 The
current concept, with GNSS service free like the air or open
roads, would no longer pertain.562
5. Using Galileo for Global Civilian GNSS
The current practice, free civilian use of military GNSS, may
not be able to continue if military GNSS radically increases en-
cryption and other defensive technology. Sharing such new
technology with civilians free of charge may no longer be possi-
ble.563 What would happen to civilian users if they were ejected
from the military GNSS? Civilians’ huge and still increasing
need for GNSS would continue. Under these pressures, there
could be a powerful impetus for a special civilian GNSS. Could
555 See Federal Agencies, GPS.GOV, https://www.gps.gov/governance/agencies/
[https://perma.cc/8FD7-SBSC].
556 Id.
557 See Exec. Order No. 13905, 85 Fed. Reg. 9359, 9360 (Feb. 12, 2020) (split-
ting authority further by adding DOC and DOE to the PNT Committee).
558 Mountin, supra note 37, at 122.
559 Milner, supra note 6.
560 See id.
561 Id.
562 Larsen, supra note 9, at 385.
563 Id.
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Galileo, as the only entirely civilian system, become GNSS for
civilians?564 The United States, China, India, and other major
countries might not wish to be beholden to and captive of the
European system, just as the Europeans did not want to become
dependent on the U.S. GPS, and therefore built Galileo.565
6. Greater Legal Authority to ITU to Resolve Harmful Interference
with GNSS
ITU member states could also give ITU legal authority to en-
force the Radio Regulations that now govern distribution of ra-
dio frequencies.566 Currently, ITU is without effective legal
enforcement power.567 ITU might receive adequate enforce-
ment oversight authority over radio interferences with assigned
frequencies. A strong, enforceable, international agreement to
protect the existing systems from all harmful interference would
fit into the existing regulation of radionavigation by ITU.568 This
is especially true because ITU, as a principle, only accepts and
records radio frequencies that do not cause significant harmless
interference in its International Master Frequency Registry.569
ITU should include adoption of a more refined definition of
harmful interference in order to manage the GNSS interference
problems.570 Such authority would require ITU, in cooperation
with the individual states, to prohibit and enforce a ban on jam-
ming, spoofing, and other radio interference. This would be a
huge change for ITU because the enforcement measures against
radio interferences would probably not be solely directed
against GNSS interferences. Such a change would not only ben-
efit civilian GNSS; it would also benefit military GNSS.571 The
likelihood of accomplishing such a major change in ITU is not
great. It could undermine military authorities’ plans to use radio
interference as a possible military tactic.572 Furthermore, ITU is
also under obligation to give special consideration to the needs
of the developing countries.573
564 Id.
565 Id.
566 Mountin, supra note 37, at 133–34.
567 Id. at 136.
568 Id.
569 Id.; see also ITU Radio Regulations, supra note 103, arts. 8.1, 8.3.
570 Id. art. 1.169.
571 Mountin, supra note 37, at 105. Note that ICAO has limited international
authority to enforce air safety. See supra Section II.B.3.
572 Id. at 107.
573 ITU Constitution, supra note 102, art. 44(2).
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7. A Ban Only on Military Interference with GNSS
Military authorities in the major space warfighting states are
now planning cyber wars that include extensive interference
with GNSS signals. Much of present interference can be traced
to military authorities.574 In fact, banning jamming and spoofing
could be accomplished by international agreement in the Dis-
armament Conference.575 Such an arrangement would leave it
to the individual states to resolve criminal and other incidental
harmful jamming and spoofing.
8. New International Agreement on Harmful Interference with
GNSS
The most effective option would be for all states to enter an
international agreement outlawing GNSS interference. All states
have a huge investment and interest in unhindered GNSS
use.576 It is in their self-interest to recognize current GNSS vul-
nerability to interference, but they might also agree to leave the
current GNSS undisturbed. The ban would be like the 1963 Nu-
clear Test Ban Treaty.577 It would limit or preclude harmful in-
terference with GNSS and it would be enforced by the
individual states.
Harmful interference is a deadly threat to the national and
international PNT systems. This threat must motivate action. It
is in the interest of the entire world to preserve them.
574 Nerijus Adomaitis, Terje Solsvik & William Maclean, Norway Says It Proved
Russian GPS Interference During NATO Exercises, REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2019), https://
www.reuters.com/article/uk-norway-defence-russia-idUKKCN1QZ1VP?edition-re
direct=UK [https://perma.cc/WH3L-AM56]; SECURE WORLD FOUND., supra note
193, at xvii.
575 About Us, supra note 113.
576 Larsen, supra note 9, at 374–75.
577 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space,
and Under Water art. 1, Aug. 5, 1963, 16 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 47.
